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ABSTRACT
The individual tax compliance gap persists despite 
costly enforcement efforts that attempt to dissuade 
noncompliance by identifying noncompliant taxpayers and 
imposing sanctions on those identified. Enforcement 
strategies that reduce the psychological incentives of 
noncompliance may complement the dissuasive approach. The 
present study probes this psychological alternative by 
examining several factors that are potential determinants of 
how taxpayers perceive their tax return results, and 
accordingly, how much reporting risk they are willing to 
assume.
Noncompliance is modelled as a two-tier process. The 
first relies on adaptation level theory that suggests 
taxpayers frame the filing of their current year tax returns 
with respect to the tax consequences of prior years' 
returns. The second relies on prospect theory that suggests 
taxpayers in loss frames are more risk prone (noncompliant) 
than those in gain frames.
Sixty-four taxpayers participated in an experiment used 
to test the noncompliance model. Participant expectations 
were based on their individual prior tax return liabilities 
and refund status amounts. The task presented them with 
current year "estimates” that reflected increased or 
decreased liabilities with respect to prior amounts and 
increased or decreased refunds or additional amounts of tax
v
owed with respect to these prior measures. Subjects rated 
their satisfaction with the estimates and their inclinations 
to modify the current returns to include ambiguous 
deductions.
Results are supportive of both tiers of the model. 
Increases in tax liability, decreases in refund amounts, and 
increases in additional tax owed induce loss frames.
Changes in the opposite directions induce gain frames. 
Taxpayers in loss frames are more inclined to include 
ambiguous deductions than those in gain frames. Cash 
position, the presumed framing determinant in previous 
studies, induces gain and loss framing, respectively, when 
there is a refund due and when additional tax is owed. The 
effects of frame on risk diminish over time although 
reported frame intensity does not appear to decline.
Implications for formulating policy that may minimize 
changes and statuses that induce loss frames are discussed. 






The estimated amount of tax revenue lost through 
noncompliance with the tax laws has tripled in the past ten 
years and has increased from $88 billion to $119 billion 
over the past five years (Smith et al. 1994). Two-thirds 
of this deficit is attributed to individual taxpayers 
(Smith et al. 1994). Noncompliance includes taxpayer 
filing decisions (including decisions not to file) that are 
explicitly in violation of tax law. The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) also includes reporting choices that result 
from taxpayer-favorable interpretations of ambiguous tax 
law but that differ from the interpretations of the IRS.
The former constitutes tax evasion; the latter, tax 
avoidance. Since both evasive and avoidance filing 
decisions have a probability of resulting in additional 
taxpayer payments of unpaid tax, interest, and penalties, 
they may be categorized as "aggressive" (risky) taxpayer 
postures. The resilience of aggressive reporting to both 
legal sanctions and to noncompliance detection efforts, 
which consume nearly two-thirds of the $5 billion IRS 
budget (IRS 1990), is evidenced by the persistence of the 
compliance gap.
The present study examines taxpayer motivation for 
noncompliance, to assess the feasibility of implementing
1
2
complementary enforcement strategies that may reduce, on 
average, the motivation to assume aggressive reporting 
postures. This chapter briefly discusses the traditional 
tax enforcement mechanism. It develops the alternative 
approach used in this study. Finally, it presents the 
research questions.
The Traditional Tax Bnforcement Meehaniam 
Sanctions as Deterrents
Tax enforcement relies on the effectiveness of legal 
sanctions (economic and punitive penalties) in deterring 
the assumption of aggressive filing postures. Legal 
penalties range from small fines to imprisonment terms. 
Recent years have witnessed stiffened penalties for both 
taxpayers and tax preparers (Wilde 1988) despite the 
nonlinear relationship between the severity of a sanction 
and its deterrence effect. For instance, Tittle (1980), 
Christiansen (1980), and Friedland (1982) provide evidence 
of a threshold effect whereby, given a threshold 
probability of detection, a mild punishment may be as 
effective a deterrent as a more severe one. Further, 
sanctions that are perceived as too severe may elicit 
complete disregard for the law; moonshining during 
Prohibition illustrates this phenomenon (Jackson and 
Milliron 1986).
In reviewing 18 studies that have examined the 
relationship between sanctions and tax compliance (Jackson
3
and Milliron 1986), sanctions have been found to deter 
noncompliance in ten of the studies. Only two found an 
adverse effect of sanctions upon compliance, and the 
remaining six studies found no effect. Interestingly, two 
of the studies (Grasmick and Scott 1982, and Schwartz and 
Orleans 1967) found that the threat of guilt feelings is a 
stronger deterrent to noncompliance than are legal 
sanctions. Overall, research results have corroborated the 
effectiveness of the sanction mechanism in deterring 
noncompliance. However, it suggests that further 
increasing the severity of sanctions may result in no 
improvement in the level of compliance or, at the extreme, 
give rise to adverse consequences.
Identification of Noncompliers
Enforcement efforts focus on the identification of 
specific taxpayer types who are likely to assume aggressive 
reporting stances despite the deterrence structure. For 
almost two decades the IRS has employed some 64 indexes of 
noncompliance to expedite the detection of those who file 
aggressively (IRS 1978). These include socio-economic 
variables among which, to name a few, are age, gender, 
education, income, and complexity of return.
Presently, the IRS is expanding its enforcement 
structure and establishing 31 District Offices of Research 
and Analysis (DORA's) that will target enforcement efforts 
at specific taxpaying market segments (Harms 1995). For
4
example, taxpayers with common sources of income (e.g., 
self-employment) or similar occupations (e.g., plumbers, 
carpenters, restauranteurs) may define a market segment.
The DORA mission's objective is to study various market 
segments to identify those that have low compliance rates 
and then to direct enforcement efforts and taxpayer 
education programs toward those specific segments. The 
Service is building a database of filed returns, beginning 
with the 1992 tax year, to expedite identification of 
noncompliant segments (Harms 1995). Identification of 
nonfilers is also on the IRS's agenda. At this time the 
Service is unsure of the tact these efforts will take since 
nonfilers elude visibility (Harms 1995) .
Research results have partially validated the IRS's 
indexes of noncompliance, but overall results are mixed.
For instance, numerous studies have examined the age 
variable. Tittle (1980) and Warneryd and Walerud (1982) 
have found that older taxpayers are more compliant.
However, several studies (e.g., Milliron 1985, Spicer and 
Becker 1980, and Spicer 1974) have found no relationship 
between age and noncompliance. The findings of Clotfelter 
(1983) suggest a curvilinear relationship between the two, 
wherein the youngest and eldest taxpaying segments are more 
compliant than those in between.
Practically all studies examining the gender variable 
have found males to be less compliant than females. One
5
exception is Friedland, Maital, and Rutenburg (1978) that 
found women less compliant than men. This study, however, 
used Israeli students as subjects and it is possible that 
the attitudes of the females in the group were less 
conservative than their U.S. counterparts. If generational 
attitudes underlie the gender/noncompliance relationship, 
as hypothesized by Tittle (1980), it is plausible that the 
attitudes of both genders are converging as non-traditional 
women emerge (Grasmick, Finley, and Glaser 1984).
The education variable refers to the taxpayer's 
technical ability to comprehend and comply with the tax 
laws (IRS 1976). Westat (1980) found that 35 percent of 
his taxpayer sample had misconceptions about tax laws, thus 
suggesting that noncompliance would be a reasonable 
expectation from this taxpaying segment. Lewis (1982) 
concurs with the rationale that misconceptions breed 
noncompliance. However, taxpayers who are well versed in 
tax law have the where-with-all to recognize and seize 
noncompliance opportunities. Accordingly, a positive 
relationship between education and noncompliance has been 
found by Witte and Woodbury (1985) and by Chang (1984) . 
Thus, it appears uncertain whether highly educated or 
poorly educated taxpayers are more likely to be 
noncompliers.
Investigations of the income variable have produced 
mixed results. Approximately one-half the studies
6
examining the relationship between income level and 
compliance have found that high income taxpayers are most 
compliant and the other one-half have found that low income 
taxpayers are most compliant. Mason and Lowry (1981) and 
Witte and Woodbury (1985) complete the spectrum by finding 
that middle income taxpayers are most compliant. Witte and 
Woodbury (1985) suggests that the relationship is 
curvilinear, but Frank and Dekeyser-Meulders (1977) 
suggests that the confounding variables of income source 
and occupation account for the mixed findings. These 
confounding variables are very closely related to 
opportunity for noncompliance, as is complexity of return, 
the next factor to be discussed.
Complexity has been argued to aid "playing the tax 
lottery" (New York State Bar Association 1972), that is, 
taxpayers' taking the chance that undercompliance will 
remain undetected and thus result in the payment of lower 
taxes. It has also been argued to enhance compliance by 
increasing taxpayer uncertainty (Westat 1980). Research 
has found complexity a significant variable in 
noncompliance, but that its directional impact depends upon 
opportunity for noncompliance (Milliron 1985). Clotfelter 
(1983) and Witte and Woodbury (1985) have found complexity 
associated with greater underreporting for nonbusiness tax 
returns, but not for business tax returns. This finding 
suggests that business returns provide a sufficient
7
opportunity for underreporting, whereas complexity is 
essential to noncompliance opportunity for nonbusiness 
returns where there is withholding at the income source. 
Numerous studies (e.g., Slemrod 1985, Witte and Woodbury 
1985, and Clotfelter 1983) have found opportunity to be the 
most important explanatory factor in noncompliance.
There is no strong research support for the IRS's 
indexes of noncompliance. All of the variables associate 
at times with noncompliance, and at other times, they do 
not. The foregoing brief discussions of five of the 64 
variables are representative of research results overall 
and are inconclusive, except perhaps for the related 
opportunity variable, which appears robust. The IRS's 
current restructuring efforts are, at least in part, 
aligned with research results in that certain market 
segments may have greater opportunity for noncompliance 
than other segments.
Enforcement Summarized
The progress to date in the tax compliance area has 
been restricted to the disincentive aspect of 
noncompliance, that is, to legislating further deterrents 
(stiffening sanctions) and specifically identifying those 
who are not dissuaded by impending sanctions. Research 
results support the use of sanctions (deterrents) and are 
descriptive of noncompliant taxpayers. Overall, however, 
the socio-economic profile of the noncompliant taxpayer is
8
inconclusive. This suggests that the use of socio-economic 
variables to detect noncompliance introduces considerable 
error into the identification process.
An Alternative Approach 
Underexploited Variables
Research has further examined the role of 
psychological variables in noncompliance. These include, 
for example, peer compliance perceptions, deterrence system 
perceptions, and taxpayer framing. Although perceptual 
variables have been shown to associate with the degree of 
compliance, they have found little place in the enforcement 
process because taxpayer perceptions elude definition and 
measurement. They are unobservable from filed returns and 
the determinants of taxpayer perceptions remain 
unidentified.
Numerous studies {e.g., Collins, Milliron, and Toy 
1992, Witte and Woodbury 1985, Geerken and Gove 1975, and 
Vogel 1974) have consistently found that higher rates of 
evasion prevail when taxpayers perceive peers as 
noncompliant. PerhapB when taxpayers believe they have 
peer approval for assuming aggressive postures they are 
more inclined to do so. Those who believe peers are 
compliant are less likely to take reporting risks, perhaps 
because they do not wish to chance the disapproval of their 
peers. Thus, perceptions of the standards of others may 
serve to foster or restrain noncompliance.
Deterrence system perceptions potentially include 
taxpayers' assessments of two probabilities; these are the 
probabilities of detection and of the imposition of 
sanctions. Noncompliant taxpayers perceive a lower chance 
of detection than compliant taxpayers (Collins, Mi11iron, 
and Toy 1992, Mason and Lowry 1981, Tittle 1980, Minor 
1978, and Vogel 19 74). Taxpayer perceptions regarding the 
likelihood of the imposition of sanctions have not been 
found significant except for subjects with precise 
information about actual probabilities (Spicer and Thomas 
1982). These results concur with other studies that have 
directly compared the relative importances of the two 
levels and found that the probability of apprehension 
outweighs the sanctions imposed (Lempert 1982, Erickson and 
Gibbs 1976, and Tittle and Logan 1973). Thus, deterrence 
system perceptions appear to influence the extent of tax 
compliance.
A decision frame is the decision-maker's "conception 
of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a 
particular choice" (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) .
Accordingly, taxpayers may frame reporting decisions as 
favorable or unfavorable, or as gains or losses, depending 
on their overall assessment of the decisions' consequences 
to themselves. Studies investigating the relationship 
between taxpayer frame and noncompliance have generally 
found that taxpayers in loss frames are less compliant than
10
those in gain frames (e.g., Chang, Nichols, and Schultz 
1987, Chang 1984, and Clotfelter 1983). An expanded 
discussion of framing studies will be presented in 
Chapter 2.
Rationale
Given that noncompliance occurs when incentives to 
file aggressively override deterrents (National Academy of 
Sciences 1989), and that enforcement efforts to date have 
focused almost exclusively on posing additional and more 
stringent deterrents, it may be possible to broaden 
enforcement strategies to reduce the noncompliance 
incentives. Strategies that reduce noncompliance 
incentives may effectively complement the current 
strategies that focus on deterrents. Unrealistic as it may 
be to expect to influence socio-economic taxpayer 
attributes that associate with aggressive filing postures, 
psychological variables may be more susceptible to 
manipulation. Kinsey's (1984) observation that 
"noncompliance exists at the intersection of perceived 
facts and perceived law” suggests that taxpayer perceptions 
are paramount and enforcement strategies introduced at the 
perceptual level may be effective. To formulate strategies 
that exert the desired influence on taxpayer perceptions, 
it is necessary to isolate the factors in the taxpaying 
environment that induce the taxpayer perceptions that are 
conducive to noncompliance. Such factors, once identified,
11
may then be able to be mitigated or eliminated, thus 
demotivating aggressive reporting. Reductions in 
noncompliance motivation could be expected to reduce the 
aggregate level of risk taking in tax reporting and 
complement the traditional deterrence mechanism to narrow 
the overall compliance gap.
Based on the foregoing rationale, the present study is 
seeking clarification of the relationship between the 
character (gain or loss) of taxpayer frame and aggressive 
reporting. Further, it is attempting to isolate contextual 
factors that characterize taxpayer frame as gain or loss 
and that may be manipulated to induce frames that are 
conducive to compliant reporting.
The Research Questions 
The first research question that will be addressed 
is: How does the character (gain or loss) of taxpayer
frame affect the level of risk taxpayers assume in making 
tax reporting decisions? To explore this question the 
present study relies on prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979), which will be discussed in Chapter 2. The 
second research question and the primary thrust of this 
study is: What variables in the taxpaying context induce
the character (gain or loss) of frame that increases tax 
reporting risk propensity? The theoretical basis for 
investigating this question will be adaptation level theory 
(Kahneman and Varey 1989), which also will be discussed in
12
Chapter 2. Insight into these research questions may 
enable the formulation of enforcement strategies that 
manipulate contextual variables so that they induce 
taxpayer frames of the type that promote risk-aversion and, 




The framing literature is pertinent to the present 
study. An individual may frame a decision choice as either 
a gain or a loss, depending on how (favorably or 
unfavorably, respectively) the decision's consequences are 
perceived by the individual. Specifically in the case of 
taxpayers, reporting decision alternatives that are 
perceived to result in taxpayer-favorable consequences may 
be framed as gains; those that would impose taxpayer- 
unfavorable consequences may be framed as losses.
How frame affects taxpayer assessments of expected 
outcomes and ultimately how these assessments drive choices 
among risk-variant reporting alternatives is suggested by 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). However, 
studies that have examined the applicability of prospect 
theory in tax compliance are inconclusive, very likely 
because the character (gain or loss) of frame has been 
misspecified. The character of frame depends on whether the 
individual views an outcome as better (gain) or worse (loss) 
than some mental benchmark that the individual perceives as 
his/her neutral condition (norm). This mental benchmark is 
the individual's framing reference point and it is not 
necessarily zero. Because taxpayers are diverse, reference
13
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points are likely to differ among taxpayers. Prior studies 
have presumed identical reference points for all subjects, 
specifically, zero-refund status. This presumed reference 
point may often have been erroneous, and frames intended to 
be of a specific character may have been the opposite.
Hence, frames may have been misspecified in prior studies 
(e.g., Dusenbury 1994, White et al. 1993, Robben et al.
1990, and Schepanski and Kelsey 1990). The use of 
misspecified frames in the statistical tests of these 
studies may have precluded consistent validation of the 
frame/risk relationship predicted by prospect theory.
Also relevant to the present study is the psychological 
literature that offers some theoretical basis for the 
selection of the taxpayer reference point. Kahneman and 
Tversky's (1979) seminal work states that "the past and 
present context of experience defines an adaptation level, 
or reference point." Accordingly, adaptation level theory 
(Kahneman and Varey 1989) will be relied upon in the present 
study to define the taxpayer reference point and further to 
test contextual factors for their contributions to this 
framing benchmark.
This chapter first discusses prospect theory. It then 
reviews prior studies that have tested prospect theory in a 
tax context. Third, it discusses adaptation level theory, 
which may clarify the ambiguities encountered in prior
15
studies. Finally, this chapter integrates prospect theory 
and adaptation level theory into the framework of the 
present research.
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) furnishes a 
descriptive model of decision-making under risk. It was 
proposed to explain decision choices that appear to violate 
the axioms of expected utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern 
1947). Prospect theory posits that gambles (prospects) are 
evaluated subjectively, in contrast to objective valuations 
of expected payoffs that are the products of the payoff 
amounts times their probabilities of realization. For 
instance, a 20 percent chance of winning $500 and a 50 
percent chance of winning $200 both have expected payoffs of 
$100, since ($500 x .20) * ($200 x .50) - $100. Under
prospect theory, the former expected outcome would be 
evaluated as ($500Vi x .20pi) , and the latter, as ($200va x 
. 50pa), where the v's are subjective weightings of payoff 
amounts and the p's are subjective weightings of their 
probabilities. Differences between weighting factors used 
in the two prospect theory computations would result in 
different valuations of alternatives and would explain why a 
decision-maker may reveal a preference for one of these 
alternatives, rather than exibiting indifference, as should 
result if expected payoffs were compared.
16
Prospect theory does not propose an alternative to 
utility maximization. Instead, it defines utility on gains 
and losses {changes in wealth or welfare) rather than on 
final asset positions (Kahneman and Tversky 197 9). It 
furnishes an alternative evaluation modification to expected 
utility theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Rankings of 
alternatives resulting under subjective valuations would be 
expected to differ from those determined objectively by a 
computation of expected payoffs. Thus, if individuals weigh 
alternatives subjectively, choices would likely differ from 
those that would be made on the basis of expected payoff 
comparisons, but yet remain within the purview of utility 
maximizat ion.
The Value and Weighting Functions
Under prospect theory, the value factor (payoff amount 
times value weighting) is a function of the individual's 
psychological frame, which may be categorically defined as 
either gain (favorable, winning) or loss (unfavorable, 
losing) with respect to the individual's psychologically 
neutral reference point. Prospect theory's value function 
is assymetric over the gain and loss domains. Specifically, 
it is concave over the gain domain, convex over the loss 
domain, and steeper for losses than for gains. Compared to 
expected payoffs which are linear (and thus symmetric), 
individuals in gain frames would be apt to undervalue
17
expected payoffs, and in loss frames, to overvalue them. 
Figure 1 graphically depicts prospect theory's value 
function on the same set of axes as the expected payoff 
function; differences in outcome valuations under these two 
valuation alternatives (subjective versus objective) may be 
observed and contrasted for the two domains. A comparison 
of expected payoffs (dashed line) to prospect valuations 
(solid line) shows that, except for marginal gain states 
(slightly to the right of the vertical axis which represents 
neutrality), individuals in gain frames undervalue expected 
payoffs, and in loss frames, overvalue them. Thus, 
according to the theory, losses loom larger than gains.
The weighting factor (probability times subjective 
weighting) is generally lower than the probability of 
occurrence since subjective weights between zero and one are 
presumed used by the decision-maker, except for very low or 
very high probabilities where the relationship is uncertain. 
Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical weighting function and also 
the objective probability component of the function. For 
practically all probabilities, the weighting function (solid 
line) undercuts the probability function (dashed line). For 
very small probabilities, the weighting function exceeds the 
actual probability (crossover of the two plots of Figure 2), 
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uncertain. Accordingly, the weighting function is not 
plotted for probabilities approaching 1 .0 .
The Frame/Risk Relationship
The assymetry of prospect theory's value function 
across the loss and gain domains (Figure 1) implies that 
risk reversals are exhibited by individuals in loss frames 
versus those in gain frames. This phenomenon is termed the 
reflection effect (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). A comparison 
of the steeper slope of the function in the loss domain to 
the more gentle slope in the gain domain reveals that, 
overall, an incremental unit of loss would be perceived as 
greater than an incremental unit of gain. Put another way, 
a loss decrement of x units would be viewed as more valuable 
than a gain increment of x units. Individuals with an 
impending loss would be willing to risk more to offset their 
loss than individuals with an impending gain would be 
willing to risk to increase their gain by an equivalent 
amount. Thus, prospect theory's risk prediction is that 
individuals in loss frames are more risk-prone than 
individuals in gain frames.
Applicability in Non-tax Areas
Prospect theory has been examined in a number of non­
tax choice contexts. These include areas involving direct 
monetary consequences such as gambling and capital markets 
investing. Also included are areas involving indirect
20
monetary consequences, such as participative budgeting, and 
nonmonetary consequences, such as patient choices of medical 
alternatives. Although an exhaustive discussion of non-tax 
studies testing the validity of prospect theory is not 
entertained here, the following studies provide evidence 
that the theory's risk predictions have received support in 
a wide range of contexts.
In repeated gamble experiments. Leopard (1978) found 
that subjects were more inclined to take risks when they 
were ''behind” than when they were "ahead”. This finding 
supports prospect theory's risk prediction that individuals 
in loss frames are more risk-prone than individuals in gain 
frames. Metzger's (1985) field study of horse track betting 
found that more speculative (risky) bets are placed in later 
races than earlier ones on any one day. Again this suggests 
that losers (the expected aggregate condition as the day 
wears on) are relatively risk prone.
Both Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) and Shefrin and 
Statman (1985) examined capital markets trades. These 
studies provide evidence that investors sell winning stocks 
too early and hold losing stocks too long. Such behaviors 
reflect the respective risk propensities (aversion and 
proneness) predicted by prospect theory's value function.
Kim (1992) examined the effect of decision frame, as 
well as dispositional risk, on the amount of slack built
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into participative budget revisions. The introduction of 
the framing variable extended previous research that had 
considered only subject-specific dispositional risk (Waller 
1988 and Young 1985). Kim (1992) found that participants 
who were already over-budget (in lose frames) at the time of 
budgetary revisions incorporated less slack in the revised 
hours to completion than those who were under-budget (in 
gain frames). This finding concurs with the prediction of 
risk-aversion for individuals in gain frames, since the 
inclusion of slack provides insurance against unforseen 
contingencies that may threaten their overall gain status. 
Losers opted to allow fewer hours for the completion of the 
task, thereby assuming an even greater risk of finishing 
over-budget, but taking the long shot at making up for their 
excess time-to-date when the total task time would be 
tallied.
Framing studies in a medical context have found that 
choices among alternative treatments may be influenced by 
the physician's perspective that is conveyed in the 
presentation of treatment alternatives. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1984), McNeil et al. (1982), and Eraker and Sox 
(1981) found that treatment choices differed depending on 
how alternatives were verbally presented. For example, when 
alternatives were framed as gains (in terms of the number of 
people who would be saved by a given therapy), the majority
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(72 percent) opted for the certain (riskless) alternative of 
saving 200 lives rather than the uncertain alternative that 
had a one-third probability of saving 600 lives and a two- 
thirds probability of saving no lives. Conversely, when the 
identical alternatives were framed as losses (in terms of 
the number of people who would die as a result of a given 
therapy), 78 percent opted for the risky (second) 
alternative. Although the end-states were identical under 
the two framing scenarios, the decided differences in risk 
propensities that emerged were dependent upon how the 
alternatives were framed and these risk propensities 
concurred with the risk predictions of prospect theory.
Prospect Thsory and Tax Compliance 
The applicability of prospect theory in tax compliance 
has been examined using archival data and further, 
empirically via the use of human subjects/taxpayers.
Overall, the results are encouraging but inconclusive. This 
section discusses three archival studies and the primary 
empirical studies. It concludes with a discussion of the 
probable weaknesses in these studies that may explain the 
ambiguous findings.
Archival Studies
The initial evidence that prospect theory may be 
applicable in tax compliance was provided by archival 
studies using large IRS databases. Clotfelter (1983) used
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the IRS's Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) to 
examine the relationship between the voluntary compliance 
rate (VCR) as assessed by IRS audit and marginal tax rates. 
Although the research question did not specifically address 
withholding status at filing time, Clotfelter (1983) 
reported that taxpayers who owed additional tax payments at 
upon filing (losers) had lower VCR's than other taxpayers. 
Thus, it appeared that losers assumed more aggressive filing 
postures than winners.
Using the 1984 TCMP files, Chang and Schultz (1990) 
replicated Clotfelter's (1983) findings. This study's 
specific objective was to test the relationship between 
withholding status and compliance rate. Although Chang and 
Schultz (1990) did find that taxpayers who owed additional 
tax were generally less compliant than those who were due a 
refund, the study also found an interraction between source 
of income with withholding position. Chang and Schultz 
(1990) concluded that other variables, both unobservable and 
uncontrollable in archival data, may also confound the 
relationship of interest and conclusive evidence would be 
obtainable only through experimental studies.
Dusenbury (1992) used data from the IRS's 1985 Tax 
Modal File to explore the reason why between 7 5 and 80 
percent of all taxpayers prepay more tax than the amount 
minimally required throughout the year. One hypothesis was
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that the widespread withholding mechanism induces a gain 
frame and thus risk aversion which could explain the 
overpayments. The link between withholding and frame was 
based on Thaler's (1985) articulation of prospect theory 
that each dollar paid at filing time (perceived as a loss) 
has a larger negative value than than each dollar never 
received because of payroll withholding (net income would 
still be perceived as a gain). Dusenbury (1992) expected to 
find that participants in payroll withholding had 
significantly higher prepayment levels than other taxpayers 
and that the withholding mechanism may thus account for the 
excess prepayments. Significance was found for six out of 
sixteen tests, thus providing some supporting evidence, 
albeit inconclusive, for prospect theory's risk predictions. 
Empirical Studies
Chang et al. (1987) was the first experimental study to 
examine whether taxpayers are generally risk-averse as 
predicted by the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) axioms. The 
overwhelming majority of the 56 subjects exhibited risk- 
aversion. However, when the subjects were partitioned on 
the basis of whether they viewed tax payments as reductions 
of gains or as certain losses, those who viewed taxes as 
losses chose to underreport hypothetical income 
significantly more often than the others. Thus emerged the 
first experimental support for prospect theory's frame/risk
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relationship. This study, however, offered no insight as to 
why or how certain taxpayers framed taxpaying as a gain 
while other taxpayers framed it as a loss. The study was 
further limited by the unrealistic, hypothetical amounts 
presented to the sparse number of subjects.
Encouraged by Clotfelter (1983) and Chang et al.
(1987), subsequent experimental studies have probed framing 
and the taxpayer frame/risk relationship. In so doing, 
these studies have attempted gain and loss frame induction 
for the subjects. Table 2.1 summarizes selected aspects of 
the five most recently published experimental studies. 
Noteworthy is that support for the theory's risk predictions 
is partial and inconsistent, despite considerable 
consistency in reference point presumptions and framing 
techniques across these studies.
Table 2.1 
Summary of Experimental Studies




Supportive at the $37,000 
incone level
Caeh Poaition Manipulated
Robben at al. 
(1990)
Supportive only whan all 
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Supportive only when both 
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Supportive only for low 
detection ratea
Caah Poaition Manipulated
Whlta at al. 
(1993)
Supportive only for high 
detection rataa t penaltiaa
Caah Poaition Manipulated 1
26
Dusenbury (1994) found the expected frame/risk 
relationship for taxpayers facing a hypothetical income 
level of about $27,000, which was held constant for all 
subjects. The findings, although supportive of the 
predicted frame/risk relationship, may not be generalizable 
to other income levels and/or may have resulted by chance. 
Schadewald (1989) failed to detect the expected relationship 
in either of two separate experiments but did find it when 
the two groups were analyzed as an aggregate. Robben et al. 
(1990) conducted studies in the USA and in five foreign 
countries. Although the expected frame/risk relationship 
was not detected in any of the separate studies, this 
relationship was significant (as predicted by prospect 
theory) in a pooled analysis of all the studies which, in 
total, included over 600 subjects. The relationship was 
found by Schepanski and Kelsey (1990) for low, but not for 
high, detection rates; by White et al. (1993) for high, but
not for low, detection rates, and also for high, but not 
low, penalty rates.
Among specific studies, supportive results have a 
randomly occurring flavor. However, they are consistently 
supportive in the aggregate analyses that increased the size 
of the sample under scrutiny. This observation suggests 
that the individual studies lacked the power to detect 
consistently the relationship of interest. A lack of power
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would not likely be attributable to omitted variables (the 
primary weakness in the archival studies) since the 
experimental context attempts to control for confounding 
factors. Therefore, a comparison of the experimental 
manipulations employed in these studies may suggest 
commonalities that are potential sources of reduced power.
In four of the studies (Dusenbury 1994, Robben et al. 
1990, Schepanski and Kelsey 1990, and White et al. 1993) the 
only reference point employed to characterize frame as gain 
or loss was the taxpayer cash position at filing time. 
Accordingly, tax refunds were presumed to induce gain frames 
and additional tax payments owed were expected to induce 
loss frames. The selection and use of the cash position 
followed the precedent set by the archival studies that were 
large-sample studies. In the archival studies, any 
misspecification of this reference point may have been 
subsumed by the comparatively greater statistical power 
afforded by their larger sample sizes.
Schadewald (1989) expanded reference point 
possibilities to include subjects' expected tax liabilities. 
Under this alternative, unexpected refunds and unexpected 
additional tax payments owed at filing time were expected to 
be perceived as gains and losses, respectively.
Schadewald's extension contemplated differences in 
taxpayers' mental orientations. Specifically, taxpayers may
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have a "cash” orientation and respond only to cash refunds 
or additional payments upon filing, or taxpayers may have an 
"accrual" orientation and respond to unexpected changes in 
refund status resulting from unexpected changes in tax 
liability. For example, a taxpayer who expected a tax 
liability of $5,000 and a corresponding refund amount of 
$500 would perhaps perceive a loss condition if a $5,300 
actual tax liability resulted and, correspondingly, reduced 
the refund amount to $200. In contrast, a taxpayer having a 
"cash" orientation and a zero-refund reference point would 
perceive the same $200 refund as a gain condition.
Schadewald (1989) examined the frame/risk relationship in 
separate experiments for these two alternative reference 
points and did not find significance in either of them 
alone.
All of the five studies presented hypothetical tax 
situations to subjects and required them to choose between 
conservative and aggressive filing alternatives. The 
presentation to subjects of hypothetical dollar amounts of 
refunds and additional payments owed were intended to induce 
gain frames if the taxpayers were to receive a refund and 
loss frames if the taxpayers owed additional tax.
Statistical tests were performed on the basis of the 
manipulated frames. Only Robben et al. (1990) also tested 
the frame/risk relationship using subject-reported frames.
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These measured frames often differed from manipulated frames 
and the results of the tests using the measured frames were 
supportive of prospect theory whereas those using 
manipulated frames were not.
Frame/Reference Point (Mis)Specification
The primary weaknesses in the foregoing studies and the 
most plausible explanations for their mixed results are 
suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in the statement 
that prospect value is a function of both (1) the position 
of the reference point and (2) the magnitude (positive or 
negative) of the change from that reference point. The 
reference point has been presumed to be zero-refund status 
in all the studies except one of Schadewald's (1989) two 
experiments. Justification for this break-even reference 
point originated with the Westat (1980) reasoning that 
people do not miss what they never have (withheld amounts) 
but miss much more any extra tax that must be paid when 
their returns are filed. Thus, refunds resulting from over­
withholding would be viewed as gains and additional tax 
payments resulting from under-withholding would be viewed as 
losses. The leap from withheld tax to all tax prepayments 
(such as estimated tax payments) has been based on anecdotal 
evidence from tax practitioners and taxpayers (Chang and 
Schultz 1990) . Based on such tenuous reasoning, the 
remaining studies in this area [except part of Schadewald
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(1989) as noted above] have accepted the zero-refund 
position as the most likely and natural reference point for 
cash-basis taxpayers.
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) explanation that the past 
and present context of experience defines a reference point 
and Robben et al.'s (1990) discovery that manipulated and 
measured frames often differed brings into question 
anecdotal acceptance of the cash position reference point.
It is unlikely that all taxpayers recurringly break-even or 
expect to break-even at filing time. Some taxpayers 
habitually elect prepayment schemes that assure a tax refund 
at filing and others pay in the minimum required to avoid an 
underpayment penalty, practically assuring that additional 
tax will be owed at filing time. It is therefore reasonable 
that reference points would differ among taxpayers with 
diverse prepayment strategy preferences and would differ 
from zero. Thus, is is likely that the use of cash position 
as the taxpayer reference point is a misspecification.
Even if the reference point were correctly specified 
(and with certainty if it were not), subjects' perceptions 
of the magnitude of the change from the reference point 
would likely vary under experimental conditions where 
specific and fixed amounts were used for all subjects. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) further indicate that identical 
amounts "may imply abject poverty for one person and great
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riches for another.” Experimental studies presented 
identical dollar amounts to all subjects in any one 
treatment group. Given diverse income levels and wealth 
states among taxpayers, it is unlikely that fixed amounts 
were equally salient to all subjects {if salient at all) or 
perceived by all subjects as equivalent departures from the 
alleged reference point.
Schadewald's (1909) examination of the alternative 
reference point, taxpayer expectations, may also have been 
sub-salient. Subjects were told what total tax liability 
they had expected and what tax liability actually resulted, 
and again, the amounts were fixed across subjects in the 
same treatment groups. Although expectations may be a 
viable alternative to the break-even point, the manner in 
which this reference point was operationalized may have 
resulted in non-salience to the subjects and misspecified 
frames may have resulted.
The types of weaknesses pervading all the literature to 
date that may explain the mixed results may be summarized as 
misspecified frames resulting from misspecified reference 
points and/or the use of dollar amounts that were neither 
salient to nor perceived equivalent by all subjects. Unless 
the taxpayer reference point is identified, taxpayer frames 
can neither be assessed nor manipulated in the tax 
enforcement process, and the application potential of
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prospect theory remains underexploited. In search of a 
theoretically sound, taxpayer-specific reference point, 
consideration of taxpaying experience in reference point 
determination appears essential. Adaptation level theory 
(Kahneman and Varey 1989), which incorporates the role of 
prior experiences into the formulation of the "norm" or 
reference point, affords a theoretical basis for reference 
point selection.
Adaptation Laval Thaory
Adaptation contemplates modifications in an organism in 
response to maintained exposure to environmental changes 
(Random House 1991). This concept underlies adaptation 
level theory (Helson 1964), which describes the process with 
respect to sensory phenomena. Sensory adaptation has been 
evidenced in response to maintained states, such as to 
continuous auditory, olfactory, or tactile stimulation 
(Thompson and Spencer 1966). An individual thus exposed 
experiences a decreasing response to the state until 
complete adaptation has occurred. At that point, there is 
no response; the state has become the individual's "norm," 
or condition of neutrality. Kahneman and Varey (1989) 
expanded the purview of adaptation level theory to include 
perceptual phenomena. Unlike sensory adaptation which is 
restricted to physical stimuli and biological responses, 
perceptual adaptation contemplates perceptual stimuli and
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psychological responses. Perceptual phenomena are evaluated 
psychologically, relative to a norm or frame of reference. 
Analogously to sensory adaptation, repeated exposure to a 
perceptual phenomenon is postulated to effect a change in 
the exposed individual's frame of reference, until the 
phenomenon is perceived as the norm (the individual's 
revised reference point). An individual's frame of 
reference is the result of the individual's prior experience 
and context. Thus, these aspects serve as the individual's 
relevant benchmarks for assessments of variant experiences 
and diverse contextual elements.
Figure 3 graphically illustrates the process of 
adaptation. Given that the individual's initial reference 
point (neutral response state) is located at point A in 
Figure 3, successive exposure to a phenomenon at point C 
causes a directional shift (leftward) of the individual's 
reference point from its initial position at A. So long as 
adaptation to the phenomenon is incomplete, the individual's 
reference point is some point B that lies to the right of C, 
and the individual perceives the phenomenon as negative, but 
of decreasing intensity as the reference point moves closer 
to C. Finally, when adaptation is complete, the revised 
reference point coincides with C and the individual's 
perception of the phenomenon is neutral.
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The application of perceptual adaptation to tax 
compliance suggests that taxpayers experience diminished 
responses to recurring tax payments. Tax return results 
would be assessed relative to an historical benchmark (frame 
of reference). Unfavorably perceived outcomes, e.g., 
refunds (payments) less (greater) than those to which the 
taxpayer has adapted would be seen as losses. Favorable 
outcomes, e.g., refunds (payments) greater (less) than those 
to which the taxpayer has adapted would be seen as gains. 
Thus, taxpayers would frame variations from prior results as 
gains or losses.
Independent of adaptation level theory, the alleged 
inportance of prior return measures in tax compliance is 
reflected in the Tax Panel's (National Academy of Sciences 
1989) recommendation that sizable changes from prior return 
measures be used to signal noncompliance. The Panel's 
intuitive rationale thus concurs with that suggested by the 
theory's postulates. The association between departures 
from prior measures and noncompliance, however, is 
unvalidated (Long and Swingen 1991). Using IRS data, Long 
and Swingen (1991) performed a cursory examination of the 
relationship between the magnitude of the changes from prior 
return measures and the incidence of noncompliance. Results 
suggested the reverse, i.e., that larger swings in return 
measures were associated with greater compliance. This
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preliminary finding may be problematic because (1) the 
direction of departures may not have been considered (this 
is unspecified in the text), and (2) the amounts examined 
were extracted from the tax returns as filed. These return 
measures already included the taxpayers' noncompliant 
adjustments, and thus were likely to have differed 
considerably from the unadjusted return measures that were 
unobservable from the data source.
The Present Research 
In general, studies to date investigating the validity 
of prospect theory's risk predictions in individual tax 
compliance have jointly tested the location of the 
anecdotally selected zero-refund reference point and the 
risk predictions of the theory. Experimental manipulations 
have further, perhaps, failed to cross the salience 
thresholds of subjects whose taxpaying levels are variant. 
Inconsistent results may be the result of reference point 
misspecification, lack of salience of expeimental dollar 
amounts, the non-applicability of the theory to tax 
reporting decisions, or some combination of these 
possibilities.
The present research builds a more comprehensive, 
theoretical model of the reference point/frame and the 
frame/risk relationships by integrating adaptation level 
theory and prospect theory. The model is used to test
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hypotheses concerning the contextual determinants of framing 
and the frame/risk relationship. Alternative reference 
points are considered and all amounts are based on subject- 





This chapter discusses theoretical models of taxpayer 
frame and taxpayer risk attitude. The former is derived 
from the postulates of adaptation level theory, and the 
latter conforms to the risk predictions of prospect theory. 
Both adaptation level theory and prospect theory were 
discussed in Chapter 2. Independent sets of hypotheses are 
developed for each model. The integration of the two models 
through taxpayer frame, their common component, completes 
the link between the hypothesized contextual variables and 
the relative levels of risk taxpayers assume in tax 
reporting decisions.
After developing the hypotheses, this chapter explains 
the experimental methods and procedures. It outlines the 
study participation criteria, presents the rationale for 
imposing these criteria, and describes subject recruitment 
procedures. Following, it discusses data collection and 
provides the rationale for obtaining these data. Finally, 
it presents the primary statistical methods and models used 




Adaptation level theory (Kahneman and Varey 1989) 
suggests that taxpayers, upon learning the preliminary 
results of their current tax returns, evaluate these results 
with respect to those they have experienced in prior years 
(their reference points). They may compare the preliminary 
results to prior results with respect to total tax 
liability, refund status, or some other measure(s) or 
combination of measures. If total tax liability is less 
than it was previously, the refund due is more, or the 
amount of additional tax owed is less, then taxpayers would 
be likely to view the preliminary results as favorable and 
frame their decisions to file their current returns (as 
prepared) as gains. Conversely, if the comparative results 
are in the opposite directions, taxpayers would be likely to 
perceive the preliminary returns as unfavorable and frame 
decisions to file the returns (as prepared) as losses. 
Taxpayer-assessed differences between current tax return 
results and prior return results would be the relevant 
framing measures.
Because adaptation level theory is silent with respect 
to timing, adaptation to prior return results may not 
precisely coincide with any given set of priors. Still, 
however, the taxpayer reference point should be some
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function of prior experience. Material departures, then, 
from prior return results should serve as salient framing 
determinants despite the potential noise introduced by 
incomplete adaptation. The primary presumption offered by 
adaptation level theory is that taxpayer frame is a function 
of current departures from prior return m&AsureB. The first 
of the two tiers of the compliance model of the present 
study may be represented by the following:
Current Departures from ____________ ^  Taxpayer
Prior Return Measures Frame
Adaptation level theory further suggests that repeated 
or prolonged exposure to the current tax return results 
would initiate a shift in the taxpayer reference point. The 
shifting reference point would approach the current return 
results. After some time, differences between the most 
recent return measures and the (revised) reference point 
would be perceived to be smaller than they were initially, 
and the frame induced by the differential would be less 
intense than the initial frame. Taxpayers who perceived the 
news of their current results as favorable (unfavorable) 
would perceive these same results as less favorable (less 
unfavorable) at a later time.
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Framing Hypotheses
Tax return measures that are likely to be among the 
most important to taxpayers are total tax liability and 
refund status. Total tax liability has been suggested by 
Schadewald (1989) for taxpayers who have an accrual 
orientation and focus on their total tax liability for a 
year, regardless of the timing of their tax payments.
Refund status has been suggested as the premier return 
measure by all the experimental studies reviewed in Chapter 
2, although zero-refund status rather than prior refund 
status was defined as the reference point. Total tax 
liability and refund status, taken together, include in 
their calculations all taxable income, allowable deductions, 
the applicable tax rate, and tax prepayments. For most 
taxpayers these component items probably have the greatest 
impact on their overall tax consequences for any one year.
If prior tax liability and prior refund status are used 
as possible taxpayer reference points, the theoretical model 
of taxpayer frame suggests that current departures from 
these prior return measures would be expected to affect 
taxpayer frame, i.e., how taxpayers view the consequences of 
the current tax return results. Decreases (increases) in 
tax liabilities, increases (decreases) in refunds due, and 
decreases (increases) in additional tax payments owed would 
be perceived as favorable (unfavorable) changes from prior
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amounts and would result in gain (loss) framing. Thus, the 
first two framing hypotheses may be stated, in their 
alternative forms, as follows:
Hla: Favorable (unfavorable) changes in tax
liabilities from prior tax liabilities 
induce gain (loss) taxpayer framing of 
the decision to file the current tax 
return.
H2a: Favorable (unfavorable) changes in refund
status amounts from prior refund status 
amounts induce gain (loss) taxpayer 
framing of the decision to file the 
current tax return.
The third framing hypothesis enables a direct test of 
adaptation theory in the tax context. It is based on 
adaptation level theory's tenet that the reference point 
shifts toward the level of the current stimulus with 
prolonged exposure to that stimulus. This last framing 
hypothesis may be stated, in the alternative form, as 
follows:
H3a: The intensity of taxpayer frame
diminishes over time.
It is expected that, at a later time, taxpayer frames are
less intense than they were at the time the taxpayers first
became aware of their current tax return results.
Taxpayer Risk Attitude 
The Frame/Risk Model
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) predicts 
that individuals in loss frames are more risk-prone than 
those in gain frames. This suggests that, in a tax context,
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taxpayer frame affects the level of reporting risk taxpayers 
are willing to assume. Specifically, taxpayers in loss 
frames would choose less compliant (riskier) reporting 
alternatives than taxpayers in gain frames. This second 
tier of the compliance model of the present study may be 




Once taxpayers learn their preliminary (compliant) tax 
return results, they may file the return as prepared (the 
safe alternative). Or, taxpayers may search for amounts 
that may possibly, but not with certainty, be construed as 
additional deductions or excludable income according to 
ambiguously phrased tax law. If taxpayers detect such 
amounts, they then have the option of modifying their 
preliminary returns accordingly and filing the resulting, 
riskier versions that afford them the chance of receiving 
more favorable tax treatment. Recall, such modifications 
are riskier because taxpayer-favorable interpretations of 
ambiguous tax law have a probability of IRS disallowance and 
sanction imposition. Thus, taxpayers may often be 





If prospect theory is applicable in a tax context, such 
as in the foregoing choice scenario, then taxpayer choices 
between the risk-variant alternatives will be affected by 
the character of their frames. The risk attitude hypothesis 
of the present study corresponds to the risk predictions of 
prospect theory. It may be stated, in the alternative form, 
as follows:
H«.: Taxpayers in loss frames are more likely
to choose risky reporting alternatives 
than taxpayers in gain frames.
The Integrated Model
The two tiers of the tax compliance model thus far 
developed in this chapter may be integrated through their 
common frame component. The integrated model may be 
represented by the following:
Current Departures from ____^  Taxpayer ____^  Taxpayer
Prior Return Measures Frame Risk Attitude
If independent tests of the two tiers of the integrated 
model provide evidence supporting both sets of hypotheses, 
then the linkage between observable tax return measures and 
taxpayer risk attitude is supported. Observable changes in 
tax return measures may be able to be used to identify 
potentially noncompliant taxpayers, thus bypassing the 
unobservable psychological nexus (taxpayer frame). The
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present study is the first to attempt to establish this 
psychological link between changes in return measures and 
noncompliance.
Subject Recruitment
Taxpayers were recruited through classes held during 
the 1995 Summer session at the University of New Orleans. 
Because the second questionnaire's construction was based on 
pre-experimental information and a repeated trial was 
necessary to test for adaptation over time, the study was 
time-sensitive and required three experimental sessions 
beyond the recruiting session. Thus, regularly scheduled 
classes, rather than other places where taxpayers convene, 
were used to minimize attrition over the study period. In 
order to maintain realism for the subjects and thereby 
enhance the quality of the data, subject selection criteria 
and recruitment procedures were designed to obtain voluntary 
participants who actually had the taxpaying latitude to 
choose between alternative reporting decisions.
Participation Criteria
To be eligible to participate in the study prospective 
subjects were required to (1) have filed U.S. tax returns 
for the 1992, 1993 and 1994 tax years, (2) have an active 
Schedule A, Schedule C, or Schedule E, (3) be willing to 
furnish blind copies of pages one and two of their Forms 
1040 as filed for the three most recently ended tax years.
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and (4) be willing to complete three short questionnaires at 
one-week intervals following the initial recruitment 
session.
The "three-year filing" criterion (the first stated 
above) was expected to filter out inexperienced taxpayers 
who would have had greater difficulty understanding and 
relating to the task. It was necessarily imposed to assure 
there would be a sufficiency of prior tax return data upon 
which to base taxpayer reference points. The "active 
schedule" criterion (the second stated above) was expected 
to assure that participants had actual opportunities to 
deduct or not deduct ambiguous items and thus would have 
viewed as realistic and salient the decisions presented in 
the task. The two remaining criteria were imposed to 
collect the required data.
Recruitment Procedure
Sixty-four subjects were recruited from evening 
classes, graduate or professional programs, and non-credit 
Saturday classes. These prospective subject pools were 
deemed to be comprised of older, more experienced, employed 
taxpayers who would be more likely to meet participation 
criteria than typical undergraduate students. Recruiting 
generally consumed about five minutes of class time. 
Instructor permission to recruit during class had been 
obtained in advance. Prospective subjects were told that
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upon completion of the experiment, they would receive $10 
and a complimentary tax consultation if they so desired. 
Volunteers selected a five-character identification code 
that was subsequently used to identify their respective 
data. The remaining three sessions were held before or 
after scheduled class meetings at one-week intervals and 
lasted five to ten minutes each.
Data Collection 
Data were collected over the three-week period 
following the recruiting session. Three questionnaires were 
administered at one-week intervals. Data may be classified 
as pre-experimental, experimental, and post-experimental.
Pre-experimental data was comprised of the participants' tax 
returns for the three prior tax years and their responses to 
the first questionnaire that obtained their anticipated 1995 
changes in taxable income (with respect to 1994), The first 
session following the recruiting session was used to collect 
these data and to obtain expectations of 1995 tax liability 
and refund status from the holdout sample. Experimental 
data is comprised of subjects' reactions (their frames) to 
hypothetical 1995 estimates presented to them and their 
inclinations (their risk propensities) to include ambiguous 
deductions that would "improve" the estimates presented.
The session following pre-experimental data collection was 
used to present to participants their 1995 "estimates" for
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the first time and obtain initial measures of frame and risk 
attitude. The last session was a repeated trial and was 
also used to obtain additional subject information (the 
post-experimental data).
Pre-experimental Data
At the second meeting, subjects furnished blind copies 
of pages one and two of their Forms 1040 for 1992, 1993, and 
1994, identified only by their participant codes. These six 
pages contained the amounts of interest, i.e., tax liability 
and refund status, for the three prior tax years. Entire 
pages, rather than only the two measures of interest, were 
collected so as not to sensitize the taxpayers to the 
pertinent amounts. Only Form 1040 was collected because 
requiring all schedules would have been likely to discourage 
participation. The required pages also indicated which 
schedules had been included with the full returns so that 
subject-specific scenarios concerning hypothetical, 
ambiguous deductions could be presented to each participant 
at the following session.
At that same meeting, all subjects completed the first 
questionnaire that is presented as the first two pages of 
Appendix A. This first questionnaire described the 
experimental context as a study of taxpayer reactions to 
proposed tax legislation. Since numerous law changes were 
currently pending in Congress and receiving considerable
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attention by the news media, participants would be likely to 
believe that the hypothetical tax return estimates presented 
to them at subsequent meetings reflected their 1995 tax 
consequences under selected, proposed provisions. The 
information requested by the questionnaire was actually 
collected in order to determine the influence, if any, that 
anticipated changes in taxable income exert on taxpayers' 
reference points. Participants, however, were told that 
their 1995 expectations were being obtained to improve the 
accuracy of the ensuing estimates.
Twenty subjects, randomly chosen from across a variety 
participating classes, also completed the third page of 
Appendix A at the second meeting. These additional data 
were the 1995 expected tax liabilities and refund status 
amounts of this subsample of participants. These 
expectations were used to derive the final pre-experimental 
data, the experimental reference points for the framing 
manipulations.
Experimental reference points were modelled 
independently for tax liability and refund status. The 
following procedures were performed using 19 of the 20 
observations; one extreme outlier was deleted for each of 
the two models under construction. First, the 1995 
expectations obtained for the holdout sample (Appendix A, 
page 2) were regressed (stepwise) on the prior three years'
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corresponding return measures and on the 1995 estimated 
changes gleaned from page one of Appendix A. The 1995 
estimated change in tax liability used in modelling the 
liability reference point was calculated as the product of 
the net estimated change in taxable income {from Appendix A, 
page 1) times the subject's marginal tax rate (obtained by
inspection of the 1994 tax return). The 1995 estimated
change in refund status used to model the refund status 
reference point was assumed to equal the 1995 estimated 
change in tax liability attributable to anticipated income 
changes that would not be subject to source withholding 
(evident from Appendix A, page 1). Both regression results
showed a high level of significance (p - .0001) for the 1994
tax return measure. The 1995 estimated changes were 
marginally significant (p = .0581) and also included 
(besides the highly significant 1994 actuals) in the 
resulting stepwise model of refund status only. No other 
independent variables reached significance at p * .15 in 
either model.
Next, the 1993 tax return measures were regressed by 
Ordinary Least Squares on the 1994 measures to isolate any 
unique information contained in the 1993 measures that was 
not captured by the 1994 measures. The residual (the unique 
1993 information) failed to reach significance at the .10 
level in either model. Nevertheless, residuals were not
51
omitted from the final models because episodes (tax return 
filings) prior to the most recent (the 1994 filing) had been 
found to influence reference points (Varey and Kahneman 
1992) .
Finally, both sets of expectations were regressed using 
Ordinary Least Squares on the corresponding 1994 measures 
that had been highly significant, the corresponding 1995 
estimated changes in return measures that had been 
marginally significant (although only for refund status), 
and the 1993 residuals that are theoretically significant. 
Again, only the 1994 measures were significant (p = .0001) 
in both regressions. Thus, for experimental manipulation 
purposes, subject reference points for tax liability and 
refund status were predicted using the intercepts and the 
coefficients of the 1994 measures that resulted from this 
third and final set of regressions. The remaining factors 
were dropped from the prediction equation. The models used 
to estimate each participant's experimental reference points 
(their 1995 expectations based on prior amounts) were as 
follows:
Tax liability reference point ■ 455.761114 + 1.055136L, 
where L is the subject's 1994 total tax liability.
Refund status reference point * 56.591744 + .855420R, 
where R is the subject's 1994 refund (additionally owed) 
amount.
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Framing Data - Trial One
The first measure of taxpayer frame was obtained at the 
third meeting by the first item of the questionnaire that is 
presented as Appendix B. Since this questionnaire also 
collected the first measure of taxpayer risk attitude, the 
order of the questions were reversed to position the framing 
inquiry after the risk questions for about one-half the 
subjects. By so doing, it would be verifiable that there 
was no order effect influencing either subject-reported 
measure. Participants were required to assess, on a scale 
of one to seven, their (dis)satisfaction with hypothetical 
1995 estimates of tax liability and refund status that were 
presented to them on the previous page (page one of Appendix 
B). Ratings below four (neutral reaction) represented loss 
frames, and ratings above four represented gain frames. The 
numerical rating was the measure of frame intensity. The 
procedures that were used to determine the hypothetical 1995 
estimates presented to participants on the first page of the 
questionnaire are described in the following paragraphs.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four 
treatment groups. The four groups were designated as "gain- 
gain, ■' "loss-loss, " "gain-loss” and "loss-gain, " according 
to the frames that were expected to result from the 
respective liability and refund status estimates presented 
to the group members. The presentation to a subject of a
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tax liability that was greater (less) than that subject's 
experimental reference point was expected to induce a loss 
(gain) frame. Estimated refund amounts (additional tax 
owed) that were less (greater) than the subjects' respective 
reference points were expected to induce loss frames; 
estimates differing from refund status reference points in 
the opposite directions were expected to induce gain frames. 
Thus, subjects in the "gain-gain" group were expected to 
report gain frames and those in the "loss-loss” group, loss 
frames. For the two groups with crossed manipulations, 
i.e., the "gain-loss" and "loss-gain” groups, induced frames 
were not predictable. These groups were included to obtain 
insight into the relative contributions to framing afforded 
by changes in the two measures. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
treatments applied to the four groups. It includes the 
rules according to which the hypothetical estimates of 1995 
tax liabilities and refund status amounts were calculated.
Hypothetical tax liability estimates were expected to 
induce gain (loss) frames when they were 30 percent less 
(greater) than the subjects' tax liability reference points. 
The selection of this percentage was somewhat arbitrary and 
based on anecdotal evidence adjusted for a margin of 
tolerance. Given that the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
decreased the top marginal tax rate by 20 percentage points, 























Manipulation Rules for Hypothetical Estimates 
Liability - gain: .70 * liability reference point
Liability - loss: 1.30 * liability reference point
Refund Status - gain: 2 * refund status reference point
when refund due;
1/2 * refund status reference point 
when additional tax owed 
Refund Status - loss: 1/2 * refund status reference point
when refund due;
2 * refund status reference point 
when additional tax owed
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effecting the largest tax cut in the history of the income 
tax (Smith et al. 1994), it is reasonable that a 20 percent 
change in tax liability is viewed as material by taxpayers. 
Because the experimental reference points developed in this 
study are not without error, and because some fluctuation in 
tax liability is expected across tax years (even without 
sizable changes in income or deductions), an additional ten 
percentage points were added, thus setting the liability 
manipulation at a 30 percent change level. The use of a 30 
percent change in subject-specific liability represents some 
degree of refinement over prior studies that used not only 
arbitrary, but also constant, amounts across subjects.
If the refund status reference point was a refund due, 
a gain frame was expected when the reference point was 
doubled, and a loss frame when it was halved. If the refund 
status reference point represented additional tax owed, a 
gain frame was expected when the reference point was halved, 
and a loss frame when it was doubled. Refund status was 
manipulated by a larger percentage change than tax 
liability because refund status dollar amounts are generally 
small compared to total tax liabilities and changes that are 
extremely small in absolute dollar amounts would probably 
fail to cross taxpayer salience thresholds. The selection 
of a factor of two was arbitrary. However, a manipulation
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check that will be discussed in Chapter 4 provides evidence 
that the use of this factor was effective.
Risk Attitude Data - Trial One
The first measures of risk attitude were also obtained 
at the third meeting by the second and third items on page 
two of the second questionnaire (Appendix B). Subjects were 
told that proposed changes in tax law were unclear in 
certain areas (e.g., itemized deductions, business 
deductions, rental property deductions) and that the wording 
could be interpreted to allow additional deductions that had 
not been deducted in arriving at the 1995 estimates 
presented on the previous page of the questionnaire. The 
specified areas of such ambiguous deductions were those for 
which the individual subjects had active schedules.
Subjects were told that the deductions, if taken, would 
have a 50 percent chance of disallowance that would trigger 
interest and penalties amounting to 50 percent of the 
underpaid tax in addition to the underpaid tax. A 
disallowance rate of .5 was used because both White et al. 
(1993) and Dusenbury (1994) had found that prospect theory's 
frame/risk relationship was most pronounced at the 50 
percent detection level. If the deductions were allowed to 
stand, then the taxpayers would reduce their taxes by 
specified percentages. Subjects were required to rate, on a 
scale of one to seven, their inclinations to take the
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additional deductions under tax reduction outcomes of both 
five percent (low level) and 20 percent (high level). These 
ratings were subsequently used to test the risk attitude 
hypothesis.
Repeated Measures
At the fourth and final meeting repeated measures of 
framing and risk attitudes were obtained by the third 
questionnaire that is presented as Appendix C. In order to 
make plausible the re-presentation of the identical 
estimates that were initially given the subjects at the 
previous meeting, the previous questionnaire (Appendix B) 
had stated that there was an uncertainty that might affect 
the estimates and additional confirmation was needed to firm 
up the estimates. On the previous questionnaire subjects 
had also been afforded the opportunity to furnish any 
additional information they might have had that could affect 
their 1995 tax consequences (page one of Appendix B). Thus, 
the presentation of final estimates at the fourth meeting 
was expected by the participants and the fact that these 
estimates remained unchanged should have been credible.
Subjects were again given their 1995 estimates of tax 
liabilities and refund status amounts. Again they were 
required to rate, on a scale of one to seven, their 
reactions (frames) and their inclinations to take the 
additional deductions (risk attitudes). Re-presentation of
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the estimates and the rating questions appear on the first 
page of the third questionnaire {Appendix C) that was 
administered at the final meeting.
Post-experimental Data
Post-experimental data were also obtained at the fourth 
meeting by the remainder of the repeated measures 
questionnaire (Appendix C). Among these data were 
participants expectations of their 1995 tax liabilities and 
refund status amounts, whether their tax returns were self- 
prepared, true/false responses to a series of questions to 
assess subject-specific risk propensities, subjects' 
attitudes toward taxpaying, their familiarity with tax law, 
and demographic information. The reasons for obtaining the 
post-experimental data are explained in the following 
paragraphs.
Expectations were obtained to perform a validation 
check on reference point modelling. The first 20 (item 
seven, parts a through t) of the true/false questions were 
taken with permission from the revised Jackson Personality 
Inventory (Jackson 1994). Specifically, they are the 
questions that instrument uses to assess the personality 
risk trait (in terms of a population percentile). Subject- 
specific risk propensity was considered a necessary control 
variable for testing the risk attitude hypothesis because 
Kim (1992) found that inter-subject risk differences, in
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addition to frame, significantly influenced subjects' 
budgeting choices under conditions of uncertainty. One of 
the remaining items (item eight of Appendix C) corresponded 
to the general gamble question used by Kim (1992) to measure 
subject-specific risk propensity. The remainder of the 
information was gathered to perform additional tests of 
competing hypotheses.
The final page of the questionnaire was included to 
remind participants that all dollar amounts discussed in the 
experiment were hypothetical and were not reliable amounts 
for their 1995 tax returns. Their signatures, indicating 
that they understood the hypothetical nature of the amounts, 
were obtained on this sheet to release all parties 
associated with the design and conduct of the experiment 
from any liability related to the rendering of misleading or 
fraudulent tax advice.
Upon completion of the last questionnaire, all subjects 
were thanked for participating and were paid the ten dollar 
participation fee. Several subjects asked personal tax 
questions that were answered immediately. Three subjects 
requested a private tax consultation at another time and 
place.
Tests of Hypotheses
The following subsections present the primary tests of 
the framing and risk attitude hypotheses. The respective
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statistical methods employed were analysis of variance and 
regression analysis. The independent and dependent 
variables included in the models are described for each of 
the tests.
Framing Hypotheses
Analysis of variance was used to test jointly the three 
framing hypotheses. The independent variables were (1) 
change in experimental (estimated) tax liability from the 
liability reference point, (2) change in experimental 
(estimated) refund status amount from the refund status 
reference point, and (3) time. The dependent variable was 
the subject-assessed reaction (frame) to the experimental 
estimates presented. Both change in liability and change in 
refund status were between-subjects factors and were 
independently characterized as either favorable (when a 
lesser liability, a greater refund, or a lesser amount of 
additional tax owed had been presented) or unfavorable (when 
a greater liability, a lesser refund, or a greater amount of 
additional tax owed had been presented), corresponding to 
the manipulations that had been applied to the treatment 
groups to which the subjects had been assigned. Time was 
the repeated measures or within-subjects factor. Main 




Regression analysis was used to test the frame/risk 
hypothesis. The independent variables were (1) the 
subject's reaction {the dependent measure of frame in the 
framing tests) and (2) the subject's individual risk 
propensity determined from responses to the final 
questionnaire. The dependent variable was the subject- 
assessed inclination to take the ambiguous deductions. 





This chapter describes the analytical procedures 
employed in this study and discusses the results obtained. 
First, it includes a preliminary inspection and examination 
of the data collected to assure that any bias introduced by 
procedural aspects of the study did not affect the validity 
of the hypothesis tests. It presents the tests of the 
framing and risk attitude hypotheses as well as tests of 
competing hypotheses. Finally, it includes an analysis 
directly relating the framing components to risk attitude, 
bypassing the frame linkage between the two.
Preliminary Inspection and Examination of Data
The 64 subjects who participated in the experiment were 
diverse with respect to a number of characteristics. These 
include age, income level, and occupational area, to name a 
few. Subject demographics are summarized in Table 4.1.
From this summary it appears that the participants were not 
"average” taxpayers. Their relatively high educational 
level was the result of recruitment through university 
enrollment. Their higher-than-average income level probably 
resulted, at least in part, from the participation criterion 
requiring a Form 1040, Schedule A, C, or E. The atypical 
characteristics of the sample, however, suggest that these 




















Adjusted Gross Income (1994)
Under $25,000
$25,000 but less than $50,000 
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that is, those taxpayers who would have the sophistication 
and opportunity to make reporting choices involving 
ambiguous deductions.
Accuracy of Expectations Modelling
The first manipulation check compared the empirically 
derived expectations (reference points) to those furnished 
by the subjects in the debriefing process. This check was 
performed to assess the accuracy of the expectations 
modelling. If the models of expectations developed from the 
subsample predicted expectations accurately for all 
taxpayers in the study, then these empirical expectations 
should approximate the subjects' actual expectations of 
their 1995 tax liabilities and refund status amounts. To 
assess the similarity of these two sets of expectations, two 
regressions were performed. In the first, subject-reported 
liability expectations, LIABEXP, were regressed on their 
respective experimental liability benchmarks, LIABENCH. In 
the second, subject-reported refund status expectations, 
RSEXP, were regressed on their experimental refund status 
benchmarks, RSBENCH. Fifty-five observations were included 
for each analysis. The remaining nine of the 64 
participants either left blank the spaces provided for 
furnishing expectations on the third questionnaire, stated 
that they had no idea what to expect, or expressed their 
responses in non-quantifiable terms such as "somewhat more 
than for 1994". For the 55 respondents to the expectations
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inquiry, the mean liability expectation was $9,324. The 
mean liability experimental benchmark was $9,680. The 
analogous amounts for refund status were $393 and $3 96, 
respectively.
The results of the regression analyses of liability and 
refund status are presented in Table 4.2. Both models are 
highly significant (p = .0001) and their R3's are .9311 and 
.9038, respectively. Thus, the modelling procedures 
employed appeared to derive experimental benchmarks that 
were fairly close estimates of the post-experimental subject 
expectations for both measures.
Test for Holdout Sample Bias
Since twenty of the 64 subjects were required to state 
their 1995 liability and refund status expectations on the 
pre-experimental questionnaire, a demand effect may have 
altered these subjects' reported reactions to the 1995 
estimates presented. Specifically, requesting expectations 
before presenting the task may have caused these subjects to 
use their stated expectations as their mental benchmarks, 
when otherwise they would have used different amounts or 
might have been unclear regarding their own expectations.
The presence of a demand effect would be evidenced by 
stronger framing for the holdout group than for the 
remaining 44 subjects. This test, therefore, investigated 
for differences in framing between the two groups. If 
differences in framing were found, then the responses of the
ee
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Pr > F 
. 0001
Variable EE Parameter Est. X Pr > T
INT 1 11.914948 .177 .8605
RSBENCH 1 .963033 22.315 .0001
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20 participants in the holdout sample could not be included 
with those of the other 44 subjects in performing the 
hypothesis tests. In the absence of a demand effect, all 64 
responses could be included, thus increasing the power of 
the tests.
A repeated measures analysis of variance was performed. 
The dependent measures were the subjects' initial and 
repeated reactions (frames). The independent class 
variables were change in liability (CHGLIAB), change in 
refund status (CHGRS), group (GRP = 1 for holdout sample and 
GRP =■ 0 otherwise) , and all interactions of these 
independent variables. Significance of any interaction term 
containing the GRP variable would have indicated framing 
differences between the two groups. Significance resulted 
for the GRP/CHGLIAB interaction, which had a p-value of 
.0707. Since this meant that inclusion of the holdout 
sample in further analyses would have had a safety 
probability of about only seven percent, responses of these 
subjects were omitted from the remainder of the analyses. 
Forty-four observations were used in the following 
discussion and tests.
Elimination of Possibility of Order Effects
Subjects were requested on the second questionnaire 
(Appendix B) to rate their reactions to the hypothetical 
estimates and also to rate their inclinations to take 
ambiguous deductions. The order of presentation of these
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two questions was randomly determined for obtaining these 
initial measures. Of the 44 participants remaining in this 
analysis, 17 were presented the reaction query before the 
inclination query (ORD = 1) and the remaining 27 received 
these questions in the reverse order (ORD » 2). This test 
was performed to afford assurance that responses to each 
question were unaffected by the order in which they appeared 
on the questionnaire.
Two analyses of variance were performed. The first one 
examined the effect of order on framing responses. Initial 
reaction (frame) was the dependent variable. Independent 
variables were CHGLIAB, CHGRS, ORD, and all possible 
interaction terms. Interaction significance involving ORD 
would have indicated that the order of the questions 
affected the framing responses. Resulting p-values for the 
CHGLIAB and CHGRS interactions with ORD were .8185 and 
.1051, respectively. The three-way interaction had a p- 
value of .2442. Thus, none of these terms reached 
significance at the alpha « .10 level.
The second analysis examined the effect of order on the 
inclination (risk propensity) responses. The dependent 
variable used was the inclination to deduct at the five 
percent tax savings level, the first inclination question 
asked. Independent variables were initial frame reaction, 
order, and their interaction. The interaction term was not 
significant (p - .2068), indicating that analysis of
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covariance was appropriate. In that analysis, ORD was not 
significant (p ■ .2915), thus assuring that the order of the 
questions did not affect responses to the risk question. 
Summary of Initial Framing Results
Subjects in the gain-gain treatment group were expected 
to report initial gain frames {reaction ratings greater than 
four on the seven-point scale) when presented with lower tax 
liabilities and higher refund amounts or lower additional 
tax owed than the subjects' experimental reference points. 
Those in the loss-loss group were presented hypothetical 
liability and refund status amounts that represented 
unfavorable departures from the experimental reference 
points, and accordingly, were expected to report initial 
loss frames (reaction ratings less than four). Reported 
frames could not be anticipated for the two groups receiving 
crossed treatments, i.e., the gain-loss and loss-gain 
groups. Of the 44 subjects under consideration, 12 received 
the gain-gain treatment, 10 the loss-loss treatment, 11 the 
gain-loss treatment, and 11 the loss-gain treatment.
Table 4.3 summarizes the initial reactions of 
participants by treatment group. Of the 12 subjects in the 
gain-gain group, 10 reported gain reactions, one reported 
a loss reaction, and one reported a neutral reaction (rating 
of four on the seven-point scale). The mean rating for the 
gain-gain group was 5.25. A t-test that the gain-gain mean 
of 5.25 exceeded four resulted in a p-value of .01 and
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G * gain 
L = loss
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confirmed that the hypothetical return results presented 
successfully induced the intended perception of gain. The 
two subjects not experiencing gain reactions were in 
negative cash positions, that is, owed additional tax. It 
is possible that these subjects had the cash mentality 
described by Shadewald (1989) and that their negative cash 
position overrode the favorable changes in return measures. 
Eight of the 10 subjects in the loss-loss group reported 
loss reactions, two reported gain reactions, and none of 
them reported neutral reactions. Again, the majority of 
subjects confronted with amounts intended to be perceived as 
unfavorable changes actually reported loss reactions. The 
two deviating in their perceptions were in positive cash 
positions, that is, were receiving refunds. Again, 
Schadewald's (1989) mental orientation explanation could 
account for why these subjects viewed the estimates as 
favorable even though these estimates represented 
unfavorable changes from prior return results. The group 
had a mean response of 2.50. A t-test that the group mean 
of 2.50 was less than four resulted in a p-value of .01, 
thus indicating that these participants overall perceived a 
loss.
Four subjects in the gain-loss group reported gain 
reactions, four reported loss reactions, and three reported 
neutral reactions. The mean response for this group was 
4.72. The loss-gain group responses favored gain reactions,
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with 7 of the 11 subjects reporting gains. Two subjects 
reported loss reactions and two reported neutral reactions. 
This fourth group mean rating was 5.18. The prevalence of 
gain perceptions for this crossed treatment group suggests 
the dominance of the favorably manipulated refund status 
measure over the unfavorably manipulated liability measure. 
Summarv_of Initial Frame/Risk Results
Subjects reporting loss reactions were expected to 
report higher inclinations to take ambiguous deductions than 
those reporting gain reactions. Table 4.4, Panel A, 
summarizes mean inclination ratings corresponding to initial 
loss, gain, and neutral reactions (frames) for both levels 
of tax savings. A t-test comparing the mean initial risk 
for gain frames to that of loss frames, i.e., 5.33 to 4.52, 
at the 5 percent tax savings level, resulted in a p-value of 
approximately .08. Taxpayers in loss frames were more 
inclined than taxpayers in gain frames to include the risky 
deductions at the 5 percent level of tax savings. Although 
the difference in means at the 20 percent tax savings was in 
the expected direction, no significant difference resulted. 
When the mean inclinations for both loss and gain frames 
were adjusted for the risk propensities corresponding to 
neutral framing, i.e., 3.50 and 3.67, prospect theory's 
predicted asymetry over the two domains became readily 
apparent and the risk propensity (Panel B) corresponding to 
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Teats of Framing Bypothssea
This section presents the tests used to explore the 
hypothesized determinants of frame and the applicability of 
adaptation level theory to framing. Recall that the first 
two framing hypotheses concern the effects on taxpayer frame 
of (1) changes in tax liability and (2} changes in refund 
status. Specifically, increased tax liabilities were 
expected to induce loss frames while decreased liabilities 
were expected to induce gain frames. Decreased refunds or 
increased additional taxes owed were expected to induce loss 
frames; changes in the opposite directions were expected to 
induce gain frames. The third framing hypothesis is that 
frame intensity diminishes over time because adaptation is 
taking place. It was expected that repeated measures of 
taxpayers' frames would converge toward neutrality.
Tests of the framing hypotheses include the primary 
tests that employ only the hypothesized framing variables, 
i.e., change in tax liability, change in refund status, and 
time. Interactive effects of these variables are considered 
in the primary tests. Tests of competing framing hypotheses 
additionally examine the effect on framing of cash position 
{refund v. additional tax owed) that has been presumed to 
dominate framing in the predecessor studies reviewed in 
Chapter 2. Two potential framing factors, whether the 
taxpayer views taxes as pure losses and whether the taxpayer 
prefers a refund, are also examined.
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Primary Framing Tests
A repeated measures analysis of variance was performed 
to test simultaneously all three framing hypotheses. 
Dependent variables were the initial reaction (FRAMED and 
the repeated reaction measure (FRAME2). Independent class 
variables were change in liability (CHGLIAB) and change in 
refund status (CHGRS). They were coded +1 and -1 for 
favorable and unfavorable changes, respectively. It was 
expected that both variables would be statistically 
significant, thereby supporting the first two hypotheses.
The CHGLIAB/CHGRS interaction was included in the model.
The use of the two reaction measures as dependent variables 
captured the effect of time, the third independent 
classification variable. All possible interactions of these 
three classification variables were included in the model. 
The interaction of time (TIME) with the independent measures 
(CHGLIAB and/or CHGRS) was expected to be significant, thus 
indicating a change in frame intensity over time.
Table 4.5 presents the results of the overall tests 
for between- and within-subjects effects. Estimated cell 
means are presented in Table 4.6, Panel A. The higher their 
values, the more favorably the subjects perceived the 
estimates. Individual choices had been made on a seven- 
point scale. The results show that change in liability, 
change in refund status, and their interaction are 
significant. The estimated main effects of Table 4.6, Panel
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Table 4.5
Overall Tests of Primary Framing Hypotheses
Panel A: Between-subjects Effects
Source EE Tvoe III SS E pr > r
CHGLIAB 1 20.4403998 4 .38 . 0430
CHGRS 1 69.7350057 14 . 93 . 0004
CHGLIAB/CHGRS 1 15.9138061 3.41 . 0724
ERROR 40 186.8636364
Panel B: Within-subjects Effects
Source EE TVDe III SS E Pr > F
TIME 1 .04526594 , 09 . 7624
TIME/CHGLIAB 1 .18106375 .37 . 5461
TIME/CHGRS 1 .04526594 .37 .5461
TIME/CHGLIAB
/CHGRS 1 .04526594 .09 .7624
ERROR 40 19.54545455
Note: P-values for the uni-directional simple effects tests
(that are one-tailed t-tests) are one-half those of 
the F-tests reported here. Pr > t for CHGLIAB and 
CHGRS are .0215 and .0002, respectively.
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Table 4.6 
Estimates for Primary Framing Tests
Panel A: Estimated Cell Means
TIME 1 TIME 2
GG 5.25 LG 5.18 GG 5.25 LG 5.09
GL 4.18 LL 2.50 GL 4.45 LL 2.50
Panel B: Estimated Main Effects
1 CHGLIAB 3.82 
1 CHGRS 3.41 
TIME 2 4.32
+1 CHGLIAB 4.78 
+1 CHGRS 5.19 
TIME 1 4.28







B, support the directionality of the hypotheses concerning 
the main effects of CHGLIAB and CHGRS. Thus, there is 
initial support for the first two hypotheses. The main 
effect of time and the interactions of time with the other 
factors do not reach significance. Thus, the adaptation 
(third) hypothesis is not supported. Since the experimental 
design was primarily directed at examining the determinants 
of frame, it is possible that it was not sufficiently 
sensitive to detect adaptation, even if it were occurring.
The significance of the interaction of CHGLIAB with 
CHGRS suggests that these factors are not simply additive, 
but that in combination they affect framing. Table 4.6, 
Panel C, presents the averages of the estimated cell means 
over time. From these averages, the presence of the 
interaction is apparent. Frame ratings across favorable 
changes in liability (or refund status) do not parallel 
those across unfavorable changes in liability (or refund 
status). For example, the difference between the two levels 
Of CHGLIAB for CHGRS - -1 (1.82 - 4.32 - 2.50) is more than 
sixteen times greater than that for CHGRS = +1 (.11 = 5.25 
- 5.14) .
To interpret the interaction, four additional repeated 
measures analyses of variance were performed, one for each 
change in liability classification (favorable or 
unfavorable) and one for each change in refund status 
classification (favorable or unfavorable). Dependent
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variables were the same as for the primary framing tests but 
the interaction term was omitted from the independent 
variables. This term was no longer necessary because, in 
each analysis, one of the independent variables assumed only 
one classification level, rather than two as in the primary 
tests. Only those observations containing the level of 
interest for the restricted variable were included in each 
analysis.
The separate analyses of the effects of CHGRS on 
framing for unfavorable and for favorable CHGLIAB were 
qualitatively the same. In both cases, CHGRS was 
significant, having p-values of .0005 and .0306, 
respectively. Analogously, when CHGRS was unfavorable, 
CHGLIAB was significant (p » .0028). However, when CHGRS 
was favorable, CHGLIAB did not affect frame (p - .4320).
This suggests that taxpayers factor both variables into 
framing except when their change in refund status is 
favorable, in which case, the favorable change in refund 
status subsumes even unfavorable liability changes. The 
dominance of a favorable change in refund status suggests 
that "additional" cash to be received (when a larger refund 
is due) or "saved" (if additional tax owed is less) in the 
present is far more salient than prepayments of any amount 
that may have contributed toward satisfying the tax 
liability. This interpretation concurs with the reasoning
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advanced in prior research (e.g., Westat 1980 and Thaler 
1985).
Tests of Competing Framing Hypotheses
The first competing hypothesis tested was the effect of 
cash position on framing. Recall, prior research almost 
unanimously used the break-even refund position as the 
presumed taxpayer reference point. Taxpayers were expected 
to frame refunds as gains and additional taxes owed as 
losses. Cash position, CASHPOS, was added to the primary 
framing model. CASHPOS was assigned a value of 1 when the 
taxpayer was in a refund position and a value of -1 when 
additional tax was owed. A comparison of the values of 
CASHPOS with those of both CHGLIAB and CHGRS suggests that 
CASHPOS is uncorrelated with either of these other two 
variables. The values of CASHPOS differ from those of 
CHGLIAB for 25 of the 44 observations and differ from those 
of CHGRS for 21 of the 44 observations. Of the 44 
observations, 28 have CASHPOS - 1 and 16 have CASHPOS = -1.
The between-subjects results of including the CASHPOS 
variable are presented in Table 4.7. Within-subjects 
effects of TIME and its interactions did not reach 
significance at the alpha = .10 level. The overall test for 
between-subjects effects shows that CHGLIAB, CHGRS, CASHPOS, 
and the CHGRS/CASHPOS interaction are significant. Further 
analysis of the CHGRS/CASHPOS interaction, performed 
analogously to the analysis of the CHGLIAB/CHGRS interaction
e i
Table 4.7
Overall Tests of Competing Framing Hypotheses 
Including CASHPOS in Model
Between-subjects Effects
Source E£ Tvoe III SS Z aAUa
CHGLIAB 1 39,3040338 12 .70 . 0012
CHGRS 1 34.0219825 10 . 99 . 0032
CHGLIAB/CHGRS 1 .9789961 . 32 . 5774
CASHPOS 1 67.1961907 21.71 . 0001
CHGLIAB/CASHPOS 1 1. 2467186 .40 . 5297
CHGRS/CASHPOS 1 10 . 5770353 3 .42 . 0728
CHGLIAB/CHGRS
/CASHPOS 1 6.2610474 2 .02 . 1636
ERROR 36 111.4503968
Note: P-values for the uni-directional simple effects tests
(that are one-tailed t-tests) are one-half those of 
the F-tests reported here. Pr > t for CHGLIAB,
CHGRS, and CASHPOS are .0006, .0016, and .0001/2,
respect ively.
82
in the primary framing test, shows that CHGLIAB and CASHPOS 
are highly significant. CHGRS is significant except when 
CASHPOS is negative.
It appears that CASHPOS does not compete with CHGLIAB 
and overrides CHGRS only when additional tax is owed. 
Overall, CASHPOS complements the hypothesized framing 
components. Together, these three factors explain over 50 
percent of the variability in frame or about 20 percent more 
than was explained by the two hypothesized variables alone 
(not shown on tables). The importance of all three factors 
in framing suggests that taxpayers have dual perspectives 
(cash and accrual as explained by Schadewald 1989) regarding 
income taxes, and that cash position appears dominant. The 
explanation previously offered as to why two taxpayers in 
each of the gain-gain and loss-loss treatment groups failed 
to perceive the estimates as anticipated, i.e., that cash 
position was controlling, is supported by these results.
The analysis including CASHPOS provides additional support 
for the first two framing hypotheses but still does not 
furnish evidence supporting the third, given that time does 
not interact with any of the independent variables in the 
model.
Further tests of competing hypotheses included in the 
progressive framing model whether taxpayers view taxes as 
pure losses (VIEW) and whether taxpayers prefer a refund 
(PREFREF). These factors had been investigated by Dusenbury
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(1994) and neither had been found significant. Of the 44 
taxpayers, 23 viewed taxes as pure losses and 3 5 indicated 
that they preferred a refund. Evidently, 23 {about one- 
half) of the subjects were dissatisfied with the services 
they receive for their tax dollars since they viewed taxes 
as pure losses. The majority, as might have been expected, 
preferred a refund. However, nine subjects did not indicate 
such a preference, and accordingly, might represent the more 
sophisticated taxpayers who prefer to defer the payment of 
taxes as long as possible to realize the time value of these 
dollars. As in Dusenbury (1994), no significance resulted 
for either VIEW or PREFREF.
Tests of Risk Attitude Hypothesis 
Risk propensity is hypothesized to be greater for 
taxpayers in loss frames than for those in gain frames. The 
primary tests of thib hypothesis are regression analyses 
that also include subject-specific risk measures, Jackson's 
(1994) and Kim's (1992), for which data were obtained on the 
third questionnaire. The former is an assessment of 
"physical, monetary, social, and ethical risk taking," with 
monetary risk taking weighed somewhat more heavily than the 
others (Jackson 1994). Responses to the 20 questions from 
the Jackson instrument (posed on the third questionnaire) 
were scored for each subject according to the instructions 
accompanying the Jackson Personality Inventory (Jackson 
1994) and equated to a population percentile. Percentiles
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were then converted to a seven-point scale for consistency 
with the other metrics in this study. The Kim risk measure 
reflects the subject's propensity to enter a monetary 
gamble. This measure was reported by subjects as a single 
response on a seven-point scale. Both the Jackson and the 
Kim risk measures were considered here because each of them 
has been found to affect individual choices under 
uncertainty. Kim (1992) used the monetary gamble and found 
that this specific risk measure, besides frame, influenced 
the riskiness of the choices the subjects made. Collins, 
Milliron and Toy (1992) found social and ethical risk 
propensities significant in tax evasion decisions. Although 
that study did not use the Jackson measure, the Jackson 
index includes the social and ethical dimensions of risk in 
addition to the monetary assessment of Kim's measure.
Further tests include a number of factors that have at 
times been found to affect risk attitude and that, for the 
most part, were briefly discussed in Chapter 1. These 
include taxpayer age, gender, educational level, adjusted 
gross income, familiarity with tax law that specifically 
affects the taxpayer's own return, familiarity with tax law 
overall, perception of peer compliance, fear of audit, fear 
of sanctions, whether the taxpayer self-prepares the return, 
and whether the taxpayer searches for all possible 
deductions.
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Primary Risk Attitude Tests
Two primary regression analyses were performed 
examining the effect of subject reactions to the 
hypothetical tax return estimates (frames) on subjects' 
inclinations to include ambiguous deductions on their 
returns (risk attitudes). The first analysis includes 
measures from the first trial and the second, the repeated 
measures. Within each trial, two measures of inclination 
had been collected, one for each of two levels of tax 
savings. For each analysis, observations having neutral 
frames (reaction ratings of 4) were omitted since neutral 
frames are not contemplated by the hypothesis under 
investigation and their inclusion might have introduced 
noise and occluded the relationship of interest. This 
resulted in the inclusion of 38 observations for each 
analysis, although the same 38 were not used in both 
regressions since subject ratings of their reactions did not 
and had not been expected to remain constant across trials. 
Since the Jackson and Kim subject-specific risk measures 
were correlated (Pearson coefficient of .41523 and p-value 
of .0006), both regressions were performed including 
separately the two risk measures, making a total of four 
primary regressions.
The first regression analysis examined the effects of 
frame (FRAMED, the Jackson risk assessment (JSPRISK), and 
their interactions (FRAME1/JSPRISK) on subjects' initial
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inclinations (risk attitudes) across levels of tax savings. 
Between- and within-subjects effects are presented in Table 
4.8. FRAME1 and the FRAME1/JSPRISK interaction are 
significant. Further analysis of the interaction showed 
that frame was significant when taxpayers' individual risk 
propensities were averse, that is, when the Jackson index 
was less than neutral, but had no effect for individually 
risk-prone subjects with above-neutral Jackson indexes.
When FRAME1 was significant, the sign of the FRAME1 
coefficient was negative, indicating that the lower the 
reaction rating (the more unfavorable the frame), the higher 
the inclination to assume risk and take the ambiguous 
deductions. This concurs with the risk predictions of 
prospect theory and supports the frame/risk hypothesis. The 
within-subjects effects of SAVINGS/JSPRISK and 
SAVINGS/FRAME1/JSPRISK are also significant. Examining the 
directionality of the data discloses a direct relationship 
between level of tax savings and risk propensity.
Similarly, the second regression examined the effects 
of the repeated reaction measure (FRAME2), JSPRISK, and 
FRAME2/JSPRISK on the subjects' repeated inclinations (risk 
attitudes) across levels of tax savings. In this analysis, 
no between- nor within-subjects effects reached significance 
at the alpha * .10 level.
The third and fourth regressions were repeats of the 
first two, but substituted the Kim risk measure for the
Table 4.6
Overall Tests of Primary Risk Attitude Hypotheses
for Initial Measures
Panel A; Between-subjects Effects
Source DF XXBC 111 SS. £ Pr > F
FRAME1 1 20.84353764 5 .33 . 0272
JSPRISK 1 7.37590424 1.89 . 1786
FRAME1/JSPRISK 1 19.13477569 4 . 89 . 0338
ERROR 34 132.96402878
Panel B: Within-subjects Effects
Source DF Tvoe III SS £ Pr > F
SAVINGS 1 4.52257261 9.03 . 0050
SAVINGS/FRAME1 1 .61970299 1,24 .2737
SAVINGS/JSPRISK 1 2.93926438 5 .87 . 0209
SAVINGS/FRAME1
/JSPRISK 1 2.24991955 4.49 . 0414
ERROR 34 17.02277992
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Jackson index. No significance resulted at the alpha = .10 
level for any between- or within-subjects effect in either 
analysis.
The results of these tests may be summarized as 
follows:
(1} Frame affects risk attitude as predicted by 
prospect theory and the frame/risk hypothesis when taxpayers 
are inherently risk-averse. The effect, however, is 
temporary; it was detected for the initial trial but not for 
the repeated trial.
(2) Tax compliance decisions entail multiple risk 
dimensions, rather than simply the inclination to enter a 
monetary gamble. The use of the Jackson index enabled the 
detection of the frame/risk relationship but the use of the 
Kim metric did not.
(3) Taxpayers assume greater risk when the potential 
tax savings are greater. This conclusion is derived from 
the significance of the within-subjects factors in the first 
regression.
Result (1) supports the fourth (frame/risk) hypothesis. 
It also suggests that, although frame intensity was not 
found to diminish in the framing tests, the effect of frame 
intensity on risk attitude did diminish over time. Result 
(2) concurs with Collins, Milliron and Toy (1992) that found 
that ethical and social risk concerns affected tax
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compliance decisions. Result (3) agrees with intuition and 
is a by-product of the tests performed here.
Tests of Competing Risk Attitude Hypotheses
The 44 observations were included in tests introducing 
eleven additional, potential risk attitude factors, most of 
which have previously been hypothesized to affect taxpayer 
reporting risk and all of which were collected by the third 
questionnaire. These additional variables are the 
following:
AGE - Taxpayer's age in years. Values for the age 
variable range from 19 to 65 years and have a mean of 37 
years.
GEN = Taxpayer's gender; 1 = male, 0 * female. This 
sample is comprised of 18 males and 26 females.
EDU ■ Taxpayer's highest completed educational level; 1 
* high school, 2 - baccalaureate, 3 - advanced degree(s). 
There are 12 one's, 14 two's, and 18 three's in the sample.
AGI - Taxpayer's 1994 adjusted gross income. AGI's 
ranged from zero to $160,419. Participants had a mean 
adjusted gross income of $57,156.
SPLAW - Taxpayer's rating of familiarity with specific 
tax law provisions that affect him/her. Ratings range from 
one to seven on a seven-point scale. The mean rating for 
SPLAW is 4.2.
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GNLAW «■ Taxpayer's rating of familiarity with general 
tax law. These ratings also range from one to seven and 
have a mean of 3.9.
PEER - 1 if taxpayer perceives peers as noncompliant 
with tax laws and 0 otherwise. Over 80 percent of 
participants believe peers are noncompliant.
AUD * 1 if taxpayer fears a tax audit of his/her return 
and 0 otherwise. About 44 percent of participants reported 
this concern.
SANC * 1 if taxpayer fears sanctions and 0 otherwise. 
About 30 percent of participants reported this concern.
SELF * 1 if taxpayer prepares own tax return and 0 
otherwise. About 52 percent of participants prepare their 
own returns.
ALL « 1 if taxpayer searches for all possible 
deductions and 0 otherwise. Almost 80 percent of 
participants reported that they search for all deductions.
Four stepwise regressions were performed, regressing 
initial and repeated subject inclinations at both levels of 
tax savings on the independent variables used in the primary 
models plus the eleven additional variables described above. 
The resulting models included up to four factors: KSPRISK, 
SPLAW, SANC, and ALL. The latter three were from among the 
additional eleven variables and KSPRISK had been previously 
included in the primary tests.
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Testa for competing risk attitude hypotheses used the 
primary risk attitude model containing the Jackson index 
expanded to include KSPRISK, SPLAW, SANC, and ALL, those 
factors identified by the Stepwise procedure. At alpha =
.10 for a one-tailed t-test, SANC, SPLAW, and ALL are 
significant for the initial trial and KSPRISK, SANC, and ALL 
are significant for the repeated trial. Frame is no longer 
significant. The differences resulting from the 
introduction of the additional variables are likely 
attributable to the duplication of information contained in 
both FRAME1 and the additional variables. Pursuing this 
explanation, FRAME1 was regressed on KSPRISK, SANC, SPLAW, 
and ALL. Both SANC and SPLAW were significant, thus 
supporting the possibility of information duplication. 
Additionally, a Pearson correlation analysis shows FRAME1 to 
be correlated with SANC, having a coefficient of .21 and a 
p-value of .09. Thus, frame and taxpayer perceptions of 
sanctions appear related and may explain the lack of 
significance of FRAME1 in the expanded model when Type III 
sums are used. Recall, Type III sums of squares reflect 
only the unique information contained in a variable and in 
this case, SANC may subsume FRAME1.
The results of the tests of competing risk attitude 
hypotheses show that the taxpayer's propensity to enter a 
monetary gamble, perceptions of sanctions, familiarity with 
specific tax provisions, and whether the taxpayer searches
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for all possible deductions influence the risk taxpayers 
assume in making reporting choices. Perceptions of 
sanctions and familiarity with specific tax laws appear to 
compete with the informational content of taxpayer frame. 
These competing variables have been found influential in 
prior studies discussed in the first two chapters.
Direct Tests of Framing Component Bffecte on Risk Attitude
Support has been obtained for the first two framing 
hypotheses and the frame/risk relationship, the two tiers of 
the theoretical model of tax compliance developed in Chapter 
3. If the relationships within each of the two tiers of the 
theoretical model are sufficiently strong, then the framing 
components identified in this study should relate directly 
to risk attitudes when the framing link is omitted. Direct 
tests of risk attitude versus framing components were 
performed to obtain additional assurance that it may be 
possible to curtail taxpayer aggressiveness by implementing 
policies that minimize "unfavorable1 changes and statuses in 
tax return measures. The three independent variables used 
in these tests were CHGLIAB, CHGRS, and CASHPOS, those that 
were found to be significant components of taxpayer frame. 
For the first analysis, the dependent variables used were 
the initial (LRISK1) and repeated (LRISK2) inclinations at 
the low (5 percent) tax savings level. For the second, 
inclinations (HRISK1 and HRISK2) at the high (20 percent) 
tax savings level were the dependent measures. Both pairs
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of dependent variables represented TIME across the 
experimental trials for each of the levels of tax savings.
Tests for between- and within-subjects effects for the 
first repeated measures analysis of variance (for low tax 
savings across trials) are presented in Tables 4.9 and 4.10, 
respectively. CHGLIAB is significant but no other between- 
subjects effect reaches significance at the alpha - .10 
level. An interesting observation emerges from the within- 
subjects tests. Despite the non-significance of TIME in the 
framing tests, here TIME interacted with CHGRS and with 
higher order interactions. This result concurs with the 
decreased effect of frame found over time in the frame/risk 
tests and again suggests that although frame intensity does 
not abate, its effects do. For the repeated measure of risk 
propensity at the low tax savings level, no factors reached 
significance at the alpha = .10 level. Similar analyses for 
the high (20 percent) tax savings level resulted in no 
significant effects at the alpha - .10 level.
These direct tests provide evidence that CHGLIAB and 
TIME do affect risk propensities, at least at low (5 
percent) levels of tax savings. Since discretionary 
reporting options are likely to involve low levels of tax 
savings more often than higher tax savings, the results of 
this direct test appear relevant. The significance of TIME 
may be indirect evidence that adaptation was occurring but 
that it was not detected in testing the third framing
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Table 4.9
Overall Direct Tests of Framing Component Effects 




CHGLIAB 1 11.8975077 2 . 14 . 1522
CHGRS 1 .2172664 .04 . 8444
CHGLIAB/CHGRS 1 .0347626 .01 . 9374
CASHPOS 1 7.1720175 1.29 .2636
CHGLIAB/CASHPOS 1 .2172664 .04 . 8444
CHGRS/CASHPOS 1 .6757883 . 12 .7294
CHGLIAB/CHGRS
/CASHPOS 1 3.8658335 , 70 .4098
ERROR 36 200.1349206
Note: P-values for the uni-directional simple effects tests
(that are one-tailed t-tests) are one-half those of 
the F-tests reported here. Pr > t for CHGLIAB,




Overall Direct Tests of Framing Component Effects 


















































Note: The P-value for the uni-directional simple effects
test (that is a one-tailed t-test) is one-half that 
of the F-test reported here. Pr > t for TIME is 
.0046.
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hypothesis. However, whether or not adaptation explains the 
temporary nature of the frame/risk relationship, the 
presence of this phenomenon may find applicability in tax 
enforcement.
Summary
The results presented in this chapter are summarized in 
Table 4.11. Support has been obtained for the first two 
framing hypotheses, i.e., that changes in tax liability and 
changes in refund status affect taxpayer frame. These 
effects are in the hypothesized directions. The risk 
attitude hypothesis, that taxpayers in loss frames make 
reporting decisions that are more aggressive than those in 
gain frames, is also supported. The adaptation (third) 
framing hypothesis is not supported.
Favorable and unfavorable changes in refund status are 
significant determinants of gain and loss frames. Favorable 
and unfavorable changes in liability are significant except 
when the change in refund status is favorable. In this 
case, a favorable change in refund status overshadows even 
an unfavorable liability change.
Although no direct support was obtained to support the 
reduction in frame intensity over time, evidence that the 
effects of frame intensity diminish over time surfaced along 
with support for the frame/risk relationship. Frame, a 
significant determinant of risk attitude for risk-averse 
taxpayers for the initial trial, lost its significance in
Table 4.11 
Summary of Results
Panel A: Results of Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis Results
Hla: Favorable (unfavorable) changes
in tax liabilities from prior tax 
liabilities induce gain (loss) tax­
payer framing of the decision to file 
the current tax return.
Supported except 
when change in 
refund status is 
favorable.
H2,: Favorable (unfavorable) changes Supported,
in refund status amounts from prior 
refund Btatus amounts induce gain (loss) 
taxpayer framing of the decision to file 
the current return.
H3a: The intensity of taxpayer frame Not supported,
diminishes over time.
H4a: Taxpayers in loss frames are more Supported for tax
likely to chooBe risky reporting alter- payers who are
natives than taxpayers in gain frames. risk-averse indi­
viduals .
Panel B: Other Significant Results
Cash position also affects taxpayer frame. Refunds due 
induce gain frames and additional taxes owed induce loss 
frames.
Although frame intensity does not diminish over time, its 
effects on reporting risk do diminish over time.
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the repeated trial. These tests not only furnish support 
for the fourth (risk) hypothesis but indicate that even if 
adaptation does not explain the waning effect of frame, its 
effects on risk attitude dissolve over time.
Cash position appears to complement change in liability 
and change in refund status and appears to be the premier 
component of framing. Taxpayers in refund positions are 
"happier" with their results than those who owe additional 
tax. This result concurs with the reasoning upon which 
prior research was based.
Other variables found to be significant risk attitude 
determinants are taxpayers' perceptions of sanctions, their 
knowledge of specific tax provisions that affect their 
personal returns, and whether they search for all possible 
deductions. Studies briefly discussed in the first chapter 
found the first two of these influential and Dusenbury 
(1994) had tested the third but did not find that it was 
related to risk attitude. The loss of significance of frame 
when these variables are included in the tests suggests that 
frame may be capturing much of the information contained in 
these three.
A direct analysis of the effects of framing components 
on risk attitude showed that change in liability and time 
are significant at lower levels of tax savings. Over time, 
the effects of change in liability disappear. This result
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again suggests that frame loses its effect on risk attitude 




This study was motivated by the enormous individual tax 
compliance gap that exists despite costly enforcement efforts 
targeted at narrowing the gap. It has sought additional 
insight into the origin of noncompliance, in order to suggest 
strategies that may reduce noncompliance incentives and 
complement the disincentive enforcement mechanism that is 
directed toward identifying and punishing taxpayers who have 
already made noncompliant decisions. A perceptual model of 
the noncompliance process has been developed and the model's 
framing and risk attitude tiers have been examined. 
Specifically, the study has investigated the effects of 
departures from prior return measures on taxpayer frame, and 
in turn, the effects of frame on the level of risk assumed in 
choosing between reporting alternatives.
In this chapter, summarized results of the framing and 
risk attitude tests are interpreted in the tax context. 
Implications for tax policy are discussed. Several 
limitations of the study are presented and implications for 
future research are explored.
Interpretation of Results
Results obtained in testing the framing and risk attitude 
hypotheses using the data obtained from the taxpayers 
participating in this experiment support the hypothesized
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framing link between changes from prior tax return measures 
and tax reporting risk propensity. These results suggest that 
taxpayers with increased tax liabilities, smaller refunds, or 
larger amounts of additional tax owed at filing, compared to 
their prior years' amounts, would be more likely to frame 
these tax return results as losses and would be more apt to 
make riskier (less compliant) modifications to these tax 
returns. The initial strength of the relationships appear to 
diminish as time passes, because either frame intensity or its 
effect on risk propensity is some decreasing function of time. 
Thus, taxpayers who are apprised of their forthcoming return 
results well ahead of filing time are likely to have reduced 
reporting risk propensities.
Xaplicatlona for Tax Policy 
The results of this study may find tax enforcement 
application in the area of tax policy. Tax policy may be able 
to be formulated so as to minimize, with respect to frequency 
and extent, the occurrence of conditions that induce loss 
frames. To reduce dramatic increases in tax liabilities from 
year to year, perhaps income averaging provisions could be 
reintroduced. These might consider income and deductions and 
require the averaging of each over three or more years. Thus, 
increases in income and decreases in deductions would be 
smoothed and the loss framing potential for taxpayers, 
reduced. Although this approach, compared to current law, 
would defer collections of tax from taxpayers with escalating
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liabilities, deferral would compare favorably with non­
collection that too often emerges from loss frames.
The negative framing effects of refund status changes may 
be minimized through stiffened prepayment requirements. 
Subjecting all income to source withholding, without 
exemption, may be one approach. Requiring prepayments equal 
to 100 percent of the current year's estimated tax liability 
may be another. Larger prepayments would not only reduce 
unfavorable refund status changes and the negative framing 
effect at filing time but would also separate in time the 
taxpayer's realization of any increase in tax liability 
(learned upon prepayment) and the filing of the return (the 
time noncompliance decisions are made). Hence, the effects of 
any loss framing induced by increased prepayments should have 
at leaBt partially waned by filing time. Requiring more 
frequent taxpayer accountability involving estimation of the 
current year's taxable income might also serve to minimize 
adverse taxpayer surprises at filing time. Implementation of 
these same prepayment policies may also reduce the number of 
taxpayers owing additional tax at filing time. Thus, the 
incidence of negative cash position, a factor found to 
complement the hypothesized framing variables in inducing loss 
frames, may also be reduced.
Remedial enforcement policy may be targeted at those 
taxpayers whose returns meet the conditions that induce loss 
frames and also exhibit latitude for taxpayer discretion in
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reporting decisions. For instance, Form 1040 tax returns with 
accompanying Schedule B (itemized deductions), Schedule C 
(self-employment), or Schedule E (rents and royalties) would 
provide taxpayers the opportunity to include ambiguous 
deductions or to overstate actual deductions on these forms. 
Auditing the returns of such taxpayers may recover tax 
revenues more effectively than the present random audit 
process. This approach concurs with the IRS's soon-to-be- 
implemented strategy discussed in Chapter 1.
The major shortfall of using tax return measures as 
indexes of loss framing and noncompliance is that filed tax 
returns already incorporate the noncompliant modifications 
made by taxpayers. The unmodified, preliminary versions of 
the returns would reflect the attributes of interest but these 
are not observable by the IRS. Returns including larger 
modifications would be even less compliant than returns 
including smaller ones. Ironically, those returns containing 
the largest tax understatements may not appear suspect. For 
instance, tax returns containing taxpayer "adjustments" that 
result in a refund due, but without which additional tax would 
have been owed, would not appear to be conducive to loss 
framing and would be likely to escape scrutiny. Although 
remedial strategies based on the results of this study may 
have limited enforcement potential, the primary contribution 
of this study lies in the formulation of preventive tax 
enforcement strategies such as those discussed above.
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Lini tations
The participation criteria imposed precluded the sample's 
representativeness of taxpayers in general. Hence, the 
results may not generalize to all taxpayers. However, the 
subject screening criteria resulted in subjects that possessed 
more education, higher income levels, and more complex tax 
returns than taxpayers in general. Participants were more 
likely to have the latitude and sophistication to assume risky 
filing postures. The sample, therefore, was representative of 
the population of interest - potentially noncompliant 
taxpayers.
Subjects were faced with the decision to include an 
ambiguous deduction. This was a tax avoidance decision.
There is no assurance that the results of the study generalize 
to decisions to engage in tax evasion. Evasion may evoke 
numerous additional ethical and social concerns that were not 
relevant here and that may contravene framing effects.
Requiring subjects to furnish copies of their prior 
years' Forms 104 0 may have sensitized them to the measures of 
interest. Even though both pages of this form were collected 
to minimize such an effect, responses to the framing questions 
may have been based on prior amounts if participants had 
reviewed their prior returns immediately before furnishing 
them. However, in actuality the same influence may be present 
because taxpayers are likely to refer to prior tax returns in 
the course of preparing the current return.
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Expectations collected in the debriefing process may have 
been influenced by the estimated amounts presented during the 
experiment. If such an effect were operating, then the tests 
for accuracy of expectations modelling may be inconclusive. 
Unbiased expectations may have differed from those reported.
Finally, there is the possibility that the experiment 
lacked realism for the subjects, despite the precautions taken 
to assure it. Subjects may not have reacted as intensely aB 
they would have in actuality and/or their reported 
inclinations to include ambiguous deductions may not have 
corresponded to what they would have done in actuality. A 
lack of realism, however, would probably have diluted both 
reactions and inclinations and, accordingly, introduced an 
unfavorable bias. Despite this possibility, results have 
emerged.
Implications for Future Rassarch
Further tax compliance research should be stimulated by 
the contributions of this study to the literature base, 
specifically, the identification of the framing components 
suggested by adaptation level theory. This study has made 
initial progress in explaining what tax return attributes 
cause taxpayers to frame their results as gains or losses. 
Further research may be able to model taxpayer framing more 
precisely.
The framing results may stimulate research in other 
disciplines as well. How individuals in non-tax contexts
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frame choices may also be relative to their prior experiences. 
Thus, non-tax research in various disciplines may be 
stimulated to examine the applicability of adaptation level 
theory to framing.
The results of this study also suggest that the effects 
of framing on noncompliance are most pronounced initially and 
diminish rapidly. Thus, timing may also play an important 
role in reducing the level of noncompliance. Future research 
might examine the manner in which time dilutes risk 
propensity. It may be that frame intensity does diminish over 
time but in this study the frames reported in the repeated 
trial were not reflecting the taxpayers' actual reactions at 
that time. Experiments designed with the primary purpose of 
investigating the frame-intensity/time curve may be warranted. 
If reported frame intensity is unchanged by time, it may be 
interesting to attempt to disentangle the intellectual 
assessment of frame from the psychological reaction to it. 
Regardless why framing effects on risk attitude diminish, the 
timing of the decreasing effects invites further research. If 
it were known how long it takes for risk propensities to wane 
after taxpayers first learn the direction and size of changes 
in their tax return results, then reporting requirements might 
be imposed to inform taxpayers of changes soon enough to 
permit risk propensity to mellow before the return must be 
filed or the final payment made.
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The study in which you have agreed to participate will 
explore your reactions to the types of tax law changes 
currently being considered by Congress. There are no right 
or wrong answers to any of the questions you will be asked. 
Simply answer them as best you can.
The next time we meet, I will provide you with an estimate 
of your 1995 tax return results given that the tax law 
changes currently under consideration are passed. To 
improve the accuracy of my estimates, please complete the 
following questionnaire.
Circle either "yes” or "no" in response to the following 
questions. For each "yes" answer, please answer the next 
question in the blank space provided for this purpose. If 
you file jointly, please consider these questions with 
respect to both you and your spouse.
In 1995, do you expect to
1. Add or lose dependents relative to 1994? Yes No
If yes, how many dependents will you 
claim for 1995? _____________
2. Have a change in marital status? Yes No
If yes, to what status? ________________
3. Begin new employment, end (quit or lose) your
old job, or both (change jobs)? Yes No
If yes, what approximate 1995 income do 
you expect from all (old and/or new) 
employment? S__________________
4. Begin a new business activity or discontinue
an old one? Yes No
If yes, what approximate 1995 net income 
do you expect from all self-employment 
activities? £_________________
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Please describe any other major changes in your tax 
circumstances for 1995 that have not been mentioned above. 
These may include such things as sales of assets, receipt of 
tax deferred distributions, or anything that may cause a 
sizable change in your income or deductions. Estimate the 
effect of these items on your taxable income.
Dollar Estimate of 
Increase (Decrease) Item in Taxable Income
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Assuming there are no changes in tax law for the 1995 
tax year, what approximate total tax liability do you expect 
to have for 1995? £__________________
Definition: Your tax liability is the total income tax 
you owe on all your taxable income for the year, not just 
the amount you pay when you file your return. Tart of this 
liability may be prepaid through payroll withholding or 
estimated tax payments you make during the year.
Assuming there are no changes in tax law for the 1995 
tax year, approximately how much, if any, do you expect to pay when you file your return? £____________________
Assuming there are no changes in tax law for the 1995 




I have calculated preliminary estimates of your 1995 
taxes based on the tax law changes now before Congress. 
There is, however, one aspect that needs additional 
confirmation. I will finalize these estimates later. For 
now, they reflect the information available to me.
Since our last meeting, have you thought of anything 
else that may affect your 1995 taxes? If so, please 
specify. _______________________________________________
The following estimates are based on the information
you provided previously:
1, Your total 1995 tax liability will be approximately$xxxxx.
Remember, your tax liability is the total income 
tax you owe on all your taxable income for the year.
You may be prepaying part of this liability through 
payroll withholding or by making estimated tax payments 
for 1995.
2. Your total 1995 refund will be approximately $XXXX.
118
1. On the following 7-point rating scale below, please 
circle the number that best summarizes your reaction to 
the estimates presented on the preceding page. The 
scale ranges from one (very dissatisfied, upset, at a 
loss) to seven (very well satisfied, lucky, pleased).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Neutral Very well
dissatisfied satisfied
2. Based on an analysis of the proposed changes, there 
appears to be an opportunity for some tax savings for 
some taxpayers. The wording of the proposals can be 
interpreted to allow an increase in certain Schedule 
(letter and title of either A, C, or E as applicable to 
the participant) deductions. The tax savings could be 
significant to you if you adopt this interpretation and 
take the additional deductions.
There is about a 50 percent chance that the IRS would 
interpret the law differently and that the deductions 
would be disallowed. If the interpretation is accepted 
by the IRS, you would end up reducing your total tax 
liability by about 5 percent. If the additional 
deductions are disallowed, you could end up paying the 
additional tax and interest and penalties amounting to 
about 50 percent of the additional tax.
On the 7-point scale below, please circle the number 
that rates your inclination to take these deductions. 
The scale ranges from one (I definitely would not take 
the deductions!) to seven (I'd definitely take the 
deductions!).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Definitely Neutral Definitely
would not would
take deductions take deductions
3. Suppose the additional deductions presented in the
previous question would reduce your taxes by 20 percent 
instead of 5 percent. Now rate your inclination to take 
the deductions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Definitely Neutral Definitely
would not would




1. Since the last time we met, I have finalized your 1995 
preliminary tax estimates and find that, based on the 
information you provided, there is no change from what was 
reported previously.
Your 1995 total tax liability will be approximately$xxxx.
Your total 1995 refund will be approximately $XXXX.
2. On the following 7-point rating scale below, please circle 
the number that best summarizes your reaction to the above 
estimates at this tiaa. The scale ranges from one (very 
dissatisfied, upset, at a loss) to seven (very well 
satisfied, lucky, pleased).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Neutral Very welldi ■satisfied satisfied
3. The questionable deductions discussed last time are not 
reflected in the above estimates. Recall, if you choose 
to take these deductions, there is a 50 percent chance 
that they will be disallowed by the IRS. If the 
deductions are allowed, you would end up reducing your 
taxes by about 5 percent. If the deductions are not 
allowed, you could end up paying the additional tax and 
interest and penalties amounting to about 50 percent of 
the additional tax.
On the 7-point scale below, please circle the number that 
rates your inclination to take these deductions. This may 
or may not be similar to how you responded last time. The 
scale ranges from one (I definitely would not take the 
deductions!) to seven (I'd definitely take the 
deductions I) .
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Definitely Neutral Definitely
would not would
take deductions take deductions
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4. Suppose the additional deductions presented In the
previous question would reduce your taxes by 20 percent 
instead of 5 percent. Now rate your inclination to take 
the deductions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Definitely Neutral Definitely
would nob would
take deductions take deduct ons
Usually (circle one)
(a) you or your spouse prepare your own tax return
(b) you pay a professional tax preparer or
(c) you have someone (friend, relative) prepare it 
for you as a favor?
Assuming there are no changes in tax law for the 1995 tax 
year, what approximate total tax liability do you expect 
to have for 1995? £__________________
Assuming there are no changes in tax law for the 1995 tax
year, approximately how much, if any, do you expect to owe
and pay when you file your return? £_________ ___________
Assuming there are no changes in tax law for the 1995 tax
year, approximately how much, if any, do you expect to 
receive as a refund when you file your return? £________
For each of the following statements, circle "T" if you 
agree that the statement is a true description of you. If 
you disagree and feel the statement falsely describes you, 
then circle "F". Please circle one of the letters for 
each statement even if you are somewhat unsure:
a. People have told me that I seem to enjoy
taking chances. T F
b. When I want something, I'll sometimes go
out on a limb to get it. T F
c. I consider security an important element
in every aspect of my life. T F
d. I rarely, if ever, take risks when there
is another alternative. T F
e. In games I usually "go for broke" rather
than playing it safe. T F
f. I try to avoid situations that have
uncertain outcomes. T F
Taking risks does not bother me if the 
gains involved are high. T
I would prefer a stable position with a 
moderate salary to one with a higher 
salary but less security. T
The thought of investing in stocks excites 
me. T
I would participate only in business under­
takings that are relatively certain. T
I would enjoy bluffing my way into an 
exclusive club or private party. T
If the possible reward was very high, I 
would not hesitate putting my money into a 
new business that could fail. T
I rarely even make small bets. T
If I invested any money in stocks, it would 
probably only be in safe stocks from large, 
well-known companies. T
I enjoy taking risks. ' T
When in school, I rarely took the chance of 
bluffing my way through an assignment. T
I would enjoy the challenge of a project 
that could mean either a promotion or loss 
of a job. T
Skin diving in the ocean would be much too 
dangerous for me. T
I think I would enjoy almost any type of 
gambling. T
I probably would not take the chance of 
borrowing money for a business deal even if 
it might be profitable. T
I think of income taxes as pure losses. T
I prefer a tax refund to an additional 
payment owed at filing time. T
I worry that my tax return will be audited. T
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x. I look for every possible tax deduction. T F
y. I'd rather overpay than underpay my taxes
because I worry what the IRS would do to me 
if they thought I was cheating. T F
z. I think people often cheat on their taxes
and get away with it. T F
8. Suppose you have a choice between playing a game in which 
you have a 50 percent chance of winning $10 and a 50 
percent chance of losing $10 or not playing the game.
On the following scale that ranges from one (extremely 
unwilling to play) to seven (extremely willing to play), 
circle the number that best describes your willingness to 
play the game,
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremely Neutral Extremely
unwilling willing
to play to play
9. Please provide the following information:
Age?
Gender? __________  (M or F)
Occupation?





10. I would rate my familiarity with overall tax law on a
scale of one (very unfamiliar) to seven (very familiar) 
as: (circle the appropriate rating below)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very Neutral Very
unfamiliar familiar
11. I would rate my familiarity with spacific tax laws that 
affect me on a scale of one (very unfamiliar) to seven 
(very familiar) as: (circle the appropriate rating below)




Please detatch this page to preserve the anonymity of 
your responses, sign it, and turn it in.
I realize that all information furnished, the potential 
tax savings presented, and the impact of proposed 
legislation on my 1995 tax status were purely hypothetical 
and do not constitute tax advice or filing recommendations. 
This study's purpose is primarily to learn about taxpayer 
responses to the types of tax law changes now pending.
Signed:
VITA
Phyllis V. Copeland, CPA, a native of New Orleans, 
Louisiana, received a bachelor of science in mathematics and 
a master of science in accounting (taxation) from the 
University of New Orleans. After numerous years combined 
professional experience in industry, public accounting, and 
academe, she entered the doctoral program at the Louisiana 
State University. Copeland completed the program in 1995, 
receiving a doctor of philosophy degree in accounting with a 
finance concentration and a minor in experimental 
statistics.
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